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Marshall S. Shapo*
Comparing Products Liability:
Concepts in European and American
Law
Introduction
The subject of products liability presents one of the most interesting
current opportunities in the comparison of legal doctrines between and
among systems of law.
Even apart from its natural attraction as a subject for comparative
analysis, this area of the law is particularly interesting for several rea-
sons. The goods we buy often turn out to be extensions of our person-
alities; we become very attached to our chattels. Added to the
psychology of product purchase and use are the revolutions in technol-
ogy and media that have made both products and their promotion much
more sophisticated than they were just a generation ago. In this sense,
American products liability decisions of the 1960s have proved
prescient.
The universality of product use, and its increasing frequency in
modern societies, heighten the value of the subject as an object of legal
comparison. Another facet of interest across legal systems is the condi-
tioning that widespread product use exerts on people who make and
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interpret laws and who otherwise participate in the legal process-espe-
cially judges and, where they serve, jurors.
Beyond the ubiquity of product use and its everyday nature are
developments particularly salient for scholarship. The evolution of
products liability law in the United States since 1960 is perhaps the most
interesting phenomenon in judge-made law in America during that
period. Confronting a spectrum of needs and desires arising from the
human condition, American judges have fashioned an increasingly
coherent set of legal rules to respond to the universe of product use.
This body of law is accessible, capable of analysis at several levels, and
possesses an intuitive attraction that makes it both initially interesting
and ultimately challenging to study.
The initial interest derives in significant measure from the empathy
that consumers and business persons will bring to the facts of many of
the leading cases. The challenge is to probe behind the superficially
interesting aspects of the decisions to identify their legal reality and
their social significance.
Lately paralleling American developments in products liability
law-entirely judge-made for many years and now partially a creature of
state legislation interpreted by the courts-is a most interesting legisla-
tive effort from the European Community: the European Products Lia-
bility Directive.'
This article will compare basic concepts in European and American
products liability law, inquiring into points of contact and contrast with
reference to how those concepts correspond with underlying realities.
Through this medium, I aim to do at least three things:
(1) Provide American lawyers with a fresh perspective on some
leading issues in the products liability law of the United States, viewed
through the prism of a remarkable piece of European Community
legislation.
(2) Provide Community lawyers with a forecast of potential
oncoming issues in Europe. I will do this by analyzing the language of
the Directive in light of the rich American experience, which constitutes
a repository of ideas, arguments and potential solutions for issues likely
to arise under the Directive.
(3) Isolate threads in disputes regarding products injuries that are
likely to prove common across industrialized and increasingly techno-
logical societies, linked by increasing bonds of media.
To talk of universal principles in private law would be an exaggera-
tion. But in speaking of common threads, I do suggest that there are
patterns of behavior, and resultant patterns of dispute and dispute reso-
lution, that are likely to replicate themselves often in the societies of
1. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive]. Footnote references to the
Preamble adopt a numbering system for paragraphs beginning with the first full
paragraph.
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America and Europe. Not only our technologies and our techniques of
product promotion, but also our devotion to the goods that occupy so
much of our everyday lives, seem to insure that future decades will fea-
ture high levels of controversy about the law in this area.
In speaking of patterns of dispute, we should note that the contro-
versies in this body of law arise not only from clashes between princi-
ples, but from the application of particular principles themselves.
Surely in American law, and to an extent in European law, there is
opportunity for lawyers to exploit both the ambiguities of language and
the competition between and among the principles themselves. In the
very richness of its rationales, American products liability law exhibits
many of the internal tensions in bodies of law applicable to diverse
communities.2
Some of the tensions within and among principles reveal them-
selves at the edges of doctrine. This article presents examples of con-
ceptual overlaps and relationships among products liability theories in
American law, and describes corresponding linkages in the European
Directive.
I. Products
A. Generally
A logical place to begin this comparative article is with the definition of
"product." This is in some sense an arbitrary concept, especially in leg-
islation like the European Directive. Yet the need to define "product"
forces analysts to confront the question of what aspect of "products"
has pushed courts and legislatures to separate them from other risk-cre-
ating aspects of life. Critics have suggested that from a welfare stand-
point, it is foolish for the law to segregate product-caused harms from
the wider, melancholy world of injuries and illnesses in general. 3
The Directive straightforwardly defines "product," with one excep-
tion,4 to "mean[] all movables . . . even though incorporated into
another movable or into an immovable."5 Under this crisp definition,
the universe of products includes chattels, and a product may be a chat-
tel that becomes a fixture.
B. Electricity
Interestingly, the Directive announces, without qualification, that
"'[p]roduct' includes electricity. ' 6 This issue has been a bone of con-
2. See, e.g., ABA Spec. Comm. on the Tort Liability System, TOWARDS A JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUS-
TICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, ch. 4 (Marshall S. Shapo, Rptr. 1984).
3. See, e.g.,Jane Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORDJ.
LEGAL STUD. 392, 421 (1986).
4. The drafters excluded "primary agricultural products and game." Directive,
supra note 1, art. 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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tention in the United States, with decisions varying considerably in their
approach to the subject.7 A key line of argument stems from courts that
say that electricity "is not a 'product,'.. . at least until [it] reaches a point
where it is made available for consumer use." There have been a few
decisions imposing strict liability when electricity entered a home, or at
least a domestic meter, at abnormally high voltage.9 However, most
courts have reasoned that "electricity is a service, not a product."' 0
Despite their reluctance to adopt strict liability for the transmission
of electricity, American courts have imposed on those who provide elec-
tricity an extremely high standard of care." One might also argue that
the provision of electricity falls within an American version of Rylands v.
Fletcher-type liability' 2 as an "abnormally dangerous activity," although
electricity would not seem to fit easily into that category because of its
commonness of usage.' 3 The literal language of the Directive seems to
sweep these possibilities before it. However, it would appear that the
provision will require interpretation, for example, as to when current
becomes "electricity" for purposes of the legislation.
C. Agricultural Products
By comparison, the Directive makes an exception to the "product" clas-
sification for "primary agricultural products and game," defining "pri-
mary agricultural products" to mean "the products of the soil, of stock-
farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone ini-
tial processing." 14 It is unclear what situations engendered the appre-
hension that fueled this provision. In a parallel development, American
courts generally have refused to hold that an animal is a product. An
Illinois appellate court, for example, reasoned that "[1living creatures,
such as ... swine ... are by their nature in a constant process of internal
development and growth and they are also participants in a constant
interaction with the environment around them as part of their
development."' 5
7. See generally I MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAw OF PRODucTs LIABILITY 7.03[3]
(1990 & Supps. 1991, 1992).
8. Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo. 1987).
9. See, e.g., Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. & Power Co., 75 N.W.2d 641 (Wis.
1979) (initiating cause as lightning striking a transmission line); Pierce v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985) (surge of electricity allegedly caused by trans-
former malfunction energized house wiring with 7,000 volts, resulting in shock to
consumer as she grasped shut-off valve on propane gas tank); Stein v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (1992) (surge attributable to modified transformer
sent high voltage into plaintiffs' electrical meter, which exploded).
10. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ohio 1988).
11. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 3 THE LAw OF TORTS, § 14.4, text accom-
panying notes 58-62 (2d ed. 1986).
12. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1981).
14. Directive, supra note 1, art. 2.
15. Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (Il1. 1980).
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There has been very little litigation on that point in the United
States, but it appears to have been a bone of contention in the drafting
of the Directive. One of the few provisions in the document that permits
local exceptions allows Member States to derogate from this excep-
tion, 16 and the preamble speaks of the possibility that some states may
believe that the exception would restrict consumer protection
"unduly." 17 With this amount of attention paid to the subject, one can
only speculate that this provision represents an extremely risk-averse
reaction on the part of European farmers. This is not to deny the argu-
ment that the "genesis and main objective of [the] Directive has always
been to amend the law relating to industrially produced goods."'
8
II. Consumers
One rather remarkable'lacuna in the Directive is its failure to define the
crucial term "consumer." The unqualified use of the language "injured
person" in some clauses may be taken to create a broad warrant for defi-
nition of this term. For example, in its creation of the general burden of
proof, Article 4 speaks of "[t]he injured person" having to prove dam-
age, defect and causation. 19 Moreover, the contributory fault provision
speaks simply of "the fault of the injured person or any person for
whom the injured person is responsible," 20 and the definition of "dam-
age" refers to damage to property "used by the injured person mainly
for his own private use or consumption."
2 1
Professor Bourgoignie has contrasted the draft directive on liability
of suppliers of services with the products liability directive by saying that
the services draft "sets out to cover the damage caused to any person
16. Directive, supra note 1, art. 15(1)(a).
17. Id. pmbl. para. 15.
18. The British Minister for Corporate and Governmental Affairs articulated this
idea in a statement announcing the Government's decision to retain the exemption
for primary agricultural goods. The Minister noted that unprocessed farm products
"are particularly prone to hidden defects caused by environmental factors beyond
the control of the producer" and that "the capacity to test the goods is generally
available at the point where the produce is subject to processing-at which point
strict liability under the Directive would apply." Statement of the Minister for Cor-
porate and Governmental Affairs, July 1, 1986, quoted in Catherine Blight, "What if
That Snail Had been in a Bottle of Milk?" Or Product Liability in the UK-The Special Case of
Agricultural Products, in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT
PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES 215, 224 (Michael Faure & Roger van
den Bergh, eds., 1989). Blight argues that the exclusion of primary agricultural
products from the Directive's strict liability rule probably produces "a socially more
efficient outcome." Id. at 228. She catalogs the virtues of a negligence rule as includ-
ing a reduction of "the external interference in the management of an industry which
some of the more extreme forms of strict liability imply;" the flexibility it permits "in
the relations of the producer and the consumer," even after litigation has begun; and
the preservation of those relationships as contrasted with the alternative of "govern-
mental regulation of production" and even of consumption. Id. at 226-28.
19. Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
20. Id. art. 8(2).
21. Id. art. 9(b)(ii).
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and not just to the consumer."'2 2 In light of this observation, and given
the lengthy struggle that has occupied American courts over the ques-
tion of bystander liability,23 the cautious observer must await interpreta-
tion of the term "consumer" by Community courts. Yet, in thinking
about the proper breadth of interpretation, one must consider the pow-
erful commitment to relief of products injuries reflected throughout the
Directive and its Preamble's frequent unqualified references to "protec-
tion of the consumer."' 24 In light of this dominant tone, it would seem
that the Directive implies a broad interpretation of the protected class,
surely beyond purchasers and probably beyond direct users of products.
HI. Producers
A. Generally
With the definition of "product" established, and some reasonable idea
of the scope of the protected class, the next logical issue concerns the
meaning of "producer," since the Directive broadly states that "[t]he
producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product. '25
In line with its general aims, the Directive defines "producer" in a rather
encompassing way. One set of definitions includes, consecutively, "the
manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or
the manufacturer of a component part."'2 6
B. Components and Raw Materials
The references to manufacturers of components as well as makers of
finished products are logical and expectable. The reference to produ-
cers of raw material might present issues of interpretation. Taken
together with the terms on either side of it, this language might be con-
strued to refer only to raw materials incorporated into finished prod-
ucts. However, one might easily interpret it to mean raw materials
themselves. The construction of this term could have considerable
22. Thierry Bourgoignie, Liability of Suppliers of Services in the European Community:
the Draft Council Directive, 1991 EUR. CONSUMER L.J. 3, 12.
23. See, e.g., I SHAPO, supra note 7, 16.02.
24. See, e.g., infra, text accompanying notes 268-75.
25. Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.
26. Id. art. 3(l). One oncoming, technology-driven problem of particular interest
with respect to the definitions of both "product" and producer is how to classify
structured electronic information. Professor Alpa has raised the particular question
of how to categorize suppliers of computer software, asserting that liability should be
"extended to the manufacturer of a machine which contains defective software and is
therefore unsafe." Guido Alpa, Manufacturer, Importer and Supplier Liability in Italy
Before and After the Implementation of the E.E.C. Directive on Damages for Defective Products,
6/7 TUL. Civ. L.F. 233, 238 (1991-92). This specific problem may yield to a solution
based on the notion that the manufacturer, as an "assembler," is responsible for all
components, including electronic ones. More difficult problems may arise with
respect to firms that only manufacture software. Presumably these issues would arise
both with respect to the definition of "product," see supra text accompanying notes 3-
16, as well as that of "producer."
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quantitative importance, since on it could turn the issue of liability for
the most extensive mass tort subject of the era, namely asbestos.
The Directive qualifies the liability of component manufacturers,
exonerating them when a defect "is attributable to the design of the
product in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions
given by the manufacturer of the product." 2 7 The American case law
indicates that battles may break out on the edges of this exception. Spe-
cifically with respect to the phrase "attributable to the design of the
product," one might expect litigation over situations in which a basic
product unit can be tailored in different ways.
Consider the sort of case in which Firm A makes a truck chassis that
Firm B will incorporate into truck bodies. This is the situation, for
example, in the manufacture of vehicles used as refuse trucks. In one
frequently cited decision, the Third Circuit denied recovery against the
chassis manufacturer for failure to install backup warning signals. 28 The
court found it persuasive that the final assembler was more expert in
designing refuse trucks and could more practically have installed the
devices. This result is logical, and arguably correct as a matter of func-
tional analysis, but there is a competing logic in the language of the
Directive. One might contend, for example, that the failure to install the
backup signals was "attributable to the design of" the chassis as well as
of the truck.
C. Trademarks and Trade Names
Besides imposing liability on manufacturers of components and com-
pleted products, the Directive defines as a "producer" "any person who,
by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the
product presents himself as its producer." 29 From the American per-
spective, this is a startlingly simple and sweeping pronouncement,
although it in fact may forecast the future path of the law in the United
States.
Since there has been little appellate litigation on the products liabil-
ity of mark holders in the United States, one might think that such a rule
would lead to a significant expansion of liability under American law.
However, a recent decision in a hard-fought case indicates that Ameri-
can courts might find the European rule appropriate. In that decision,
the Ninth Circuit relied on the Arizona Supreme Court's answer to a
certified question for the proposition that strict liability applies to
"trademark licensors who significantly participate in the overall process
by which the product reaches its consumers, and who have the right to
control the incidents of manufacture or distribution."3 0 This statement
of the rule largely embodies its rationale, focusing on control of the
27. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(o.
28. Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
29. Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
30. Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750, 751 (9th Cir. 1990),
(quoting Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 946-47 (Ariz. 1990)).
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making and marketing of the product. If it should persuade a number of
American courts, one would expect a rise in litigation against mark hold-
ers. That would not be a surprising development, given the ability of
mark holders to shape the destiny of products, both as to form and man-
ner of presentation to the public.
I
D. Importers
The Directive also extends its strict liability rule to importers, another
class of enterprises concerning which there have been few reported deci-
sions in America. The language is inclusive, and indeed intriguing in its
potential breadth. The Directive declares that "any person who imports
into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of dis-
tribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer
... and shall be responsible as a producer." 3'
It would appear that also in this respect, the Community may show
the way to, or at least parallel, the developing American law. In uphold-
ing the imposition of strict liability on the only importer of Volkswagens
in the United States, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed a decision
in which its intermediate court declared that the defendant was "a signif-
icant part of the marketing enterprise of Volkswagen automobiles in this
nation."'3 2 The intermediate court also had emphasized that the defend-
ant was "in a position to adjust the costs of suh liability with the foreign
manufacturer," something that could not be done by the "plaintiff or
other consumers." 3 3
Most of the legal action with respect to foreign products entering
the United States has dealt with the jurisdictional question of whether
the plaintiff has established that a defendant seller has "purposefully
directed" an action "toward the forum State."'3 4 This was the test that
Justice O'Connor and three colleagues announced in Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court,35 a case in which eight justices employed the
abstract language of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" in denying jurisdiction.3 6
Asahi and many decisions that interpret it37 are not necessarily at
variance with the rationale for imposing strict liability on importers.
Rather, one may view Asahi as running in the same track as the strict
liability decisions. The basic question is whether the defendant bears
significant responsibility for the marketing of the product in America.
31. Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
32. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 776 (Wash. 1975) (quoting
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 525 P.2d 286, 289 (Wash. App.
1974)).
33. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 525 P.2d at 289.
34. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 113-16 (referring to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
37. See 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY 31.01[2] (1990
& Supps. 1991, 1992).
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E. Suppliers
The Directive closes its broad curtilage of the definition of "producer"
with a paragraph that imposes liability when "the producer of the prod-
uct cannot be identified."'38 In that case, "each supplier of the product
shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured person,
within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the person
who supplied him with the product."3 9 The same paragraph applies this
rule to imported products that do "not indicate the identity of the
importer ... even if the name of the producer is indicated."
40
The term "supplier" in this paragraph appears to expand the defini-
tion of those liable for product defects throughout the distributional
chain. It seems easily capable of a construction that embraces interme-
diate sellers, including wholesalers and retailers, and perhaps even
other parties with distributional functions.
4 1
The evident intent of the drafters was to emphasize that the Direc-
tive extends its no-fault liability to a wide variety of firms that have a
hand in the transmission of products to consumers, but also seeks to
constrain liability for reasons of both fairness and economic good sense
when firms do not exert the whip hand on product quality. The key to
this provision appears to be a desire to pave the consumer's way to the
controlling actor. The method is to place the burden on those who
ought to be in a position to provide information about the identity of the
controlling actor. The sub-provision on importers makes clear the
important position of those firms in the Community and, indeed, in an
increasingly interdependent world.
The provision finesses the problems ofjustice inherent in the long-
running American debate about retailer strict liability. 4 2 It achieves an
equitable solution to the unfairness of imposing liability on retailers,
especially those who sell products in sealed packages, for defects of
which they could not possibly have been aware. As a practical matter, it
tells such firms that if they keep records and can point the finger to the
originator of the defect, they can escape liability.
The Directive places the burden on the consumer to show "the
damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and dam-
age."'4 3 This classification scheme lines up closely with the American
law, which in addition would emphasize another requirement with a
strong policy orientation. Depending on the doctrinal catechism to
38. Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. One might find ancillary support for a broad construction of this language in
a provision of the preamble, apparently primarily directed at other issues, that says
that "in situations where several persons are liable for the same damage, the protec-
tion of the consumer requires that the injured person should be able to claim full
compensation for the damage from any one of them." Id pmbl. para. 5.
42. See generally 1 SHAPO, supra note 7, 12.04[2][b].
43. Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
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which the interpreter subscribes, this element would be that either of
duty or proximate cause.
IV. Damages
A. Generally
The Directive limits its definition of "damage" to "death or ... personal
injuries" 44 or "damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other
than the defective product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU."'45
The Directive preserves "national provisions relating to non-material
damage,"'46 which includes, among other things, pain and suffering.47
The property damage category contains the further limitation that
the item must be "of a type ordinarily intended for private use or con-
sumption" and that it have been "used by the injured person mainly for
his own private use or consumption."' 48 The Preamble indicates that the
drafters intended the limits on recovery for property damage-both the
threshold and the requirement of private use or consumption-"to
avoid litigation in an excessive number of cases." 49
B. Economic Loss
The damages provisions appear to settle a large wedge of problems that
have occupied American courts under the heading of "economic loss."
For example, the Directive seems to make clear that there will be no
liability in Europe for the kind of claim the plaintiff made in East River
S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 50 In that case, in which the United
States Supreme Court took its only direct cut at the products liability
area, a unanimous court denied recovery for damage to ship turbines
allegedly caused by defects in the turbines.
At least some of the alleged defects in the East River turbines mani-
fested themselves in component deterioration and disintegration. One
might, without more, have taken a denial of liability in that case to leave
room for claims for damages to the purchased product arising from a
traumatic accident. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, has said it
would impose liability for damage to the purchased product in a "sud-
den and calamitous" occurrence. 51 It took that stand in a case in which
an alleged defect in truck brakes caused an accident that damaged the
vehicle beyond repair.
But Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Supreme Court made clear
that he would not draw distinctions based on the type of injury. Noting
44. Id. art. 9(a).
45. Id. art. 9(b).
46. Id. art. 9.
47. The Preamble says that the Directive "should not prejudice compensation for
pain and suffering and other non-material damages." Id. pmbl. para. 9.
48. Id. art. 9(b).
49. Id. pmbl. para. 9.
50. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
51. Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 466 N.E.2d 195, 196-97 (Il1. 1984).
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that damages could be either "qualitative, occurring through gradual
deterioration or internal breakage," or "calamitous," he declared that
"either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged,
the resulting loss is purely economic."'5 2
Justice Blackmun rationalized the exclusion of such cases from the
protection of products liability law on the ground that they involved sit-
uations in which the vice of the product was only that it had "not met the
customer's expectations, or, in other words, that the consumer has
received 'insufficient product value.' ,,53 The rule of the Directive
appears to have accepted this position completely.
The only question that might be raised concerning this judgment,
both by the Community and the United States Supreme Court, is
whether it appropriately strikes the balance with respect to deterring
defects that are dangerous to persons and other property rather than
only to the product itself. The Washington Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, has argued that the focus, even in suits for strictly economic loss,
should be on "risk of harm." 54 Declaring that the "increased certainty"
achieved by East River "comes at too high a price," the Washington
court said that the United States Supreme Court had "unjustifiably dis-
miss[ed] the safety concerns attendant to product injuries caused by haz-
ardous defects." 55
The preamble to the Directive declares that "the protection of the
consumer requires compensation for death and personal injury as well
as compensation for damage to property."5 6 Although the plain lan-
guage of the Directive excludes economic loss, one may question
whether this legislative choice harmonizes with the needs identified in
the Preamble.
V. Theory of Liability
The policy heart of the Directive, as is the case with American products
liability law, lies in its imposition of strict liability. The text of the Direc-
tive itself does not mention the concept by name,5 7 but it is implicit in
the simple requirement of Article 4 that the claimant must prove-but
presumably need prove no more than-"the damage, the defect and the
52. 476 U.S. at 870.
53. Id. at 872 (quotingJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 406
(2d ed. 1980)).
54. Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1209
(Wash. 1989).
55. Id.
56. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 9.
57. Portugal has gone further with its declaration that "the producer is liable in
the absence of fault for the damage caused by the defects in the products that he has
put on the market." Decreto-lei No. 383/89, Art. 1, quoted in Joao Calvao da Silva,
Implementation of the EEC Product Liability Directive in Portugal, 1992 EUR. CONSUMER L.J.
36, 36. Professor Silva says that "[t]he reason for this explicit sanctioning of the
[strict liability] principle is to erase all doubt about the 'fall of the citadel' and to
emphasise the strict liability of the producer to the consumer." Id.
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causal relationship."'5 8 The Preamble makes clear what the text implies,
saying that "liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole
means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increas-
ing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern
technological production." '5 9
Presumably, the Preamble draws on a variety of considerations in
making this assertion. The reference to "technicality" evokes concerns
of the sort that Jacques Ellul discussed in his work The Technological Sod-
ety. 60 Together with the echoing phrase "modem technological produc-
tion," this language implies legislative premises about the virtual
impossibility that consumers will understand the workings of the prod-
ucts they buy and the difficulty of uncovering relevant information in
litigation.
It is no coincidence that the first three major cases that established
strict liability principles in the United States-under different labels-all
involved machines of varying levels of complexity.
(1) In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,6 1 the New Jersey Supreme Court
dealt with a case in which a car ran off the road without explana-
tion, and it was impossible to provide the explanation because of
the destruction of the vehicle's front end. In this decision, just
before the formal invention of the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
the court employed the theory of implied warranty of
merchantability.
(2) In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,62 the California Supreme
Court used the strict liability doctrine for the first time in deciding
a case that arose from injuries attributed to a home power tool.
(3) Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.63 represented the first venture
of the New York Court of Appeals into the new doctrinal territory.
This case involved an allegedly defective altimeter on an airplane
that crashed, with much loss of life. Feeling itself doctrinally
bound to use implied warranty theory, the court said that it
believed that "strict tort liability" was "surely a more accurate
phrase." 4
Taken together, these decisions indicate why strict liability doctrine
has so attracted American courts with respect to products of "increasing
technicality."
It remains to ask what the drafters of the Directive meant when they
58. Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
59. Id. pmbl. para. 2.
60. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocIErY (. Wilkinson trans., 1965).
Ellul referred in that work to the "clear technical intention," comprising "a precise
view of technical possibilities, the will to attain certain ends, application in all areas,
and adherence of the whole of society to a conspicuous technical objective." He
called this the "distinctive characteristic of our time." Id. at 52.
61. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
62. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
63. 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963).
64. Id. at 83.
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spoke of "a fair apportionment of the risks." 6 5 The question of what is
fair, in the sense that the drafters used the term, may relate partly to the
information disadvantage that consumers frequently face. However,
although the Preamble does not spell out the meaning of the word, it
seems reasonable to believe that it also carries equitable content in an
assumed context of mass production. The language certainly is capable
of a reading that indicates that there are grounds for liability in the fact
of a consumer's misfortune in situations in which the product has
increased the happiness of most or all other users. If this interpretation
is correct, the concept of fairness embedded in the Preamble may raise
the controversial question of whether loss spreading is an appropriate
rationale for liability without fault.
VI. Defect
A. General Definition
If the policy heart of the Directive resides in the idea of liability without
fault, its conceptual core lies in the notion of defect.
The Directive's positive definition of defect appears in brief com-
pass in Article 6:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person
is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 66
B. Consumer Expectations
1. Generally
The parallel language of the Preamble is also quite concise, although it
implies decisions on matters that have consumed gallons of American
judicial ink. The Preamble, declaring as its purpose "to protect the
physical well-being and property of the consumer," says that "the defec-
tiveness of the product should be determined by reference not to its
fitness for use but to the lack of the safety which the public at large is
entitled to expect." 6 7 This paragraph specifically excludes "misuse ...
not reasonable under the circumstances." '68
This writer particularly approves the very first item in the Direc-
tive's catalog of factors, which speaks of "the presentation of the prod-
uct."' 69 This language is capable of a variety of readings, ranging from
65. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 2.
66. Id. art. 6(1).
67. Id. pmbl. para. 6.
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 6(l)(a).
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advertising and product promotion in the broadest sense to the appear-
ance of the product as it manifests itself to the consumer.
The writer has encompassed this full range of meaning under the
concept of "product portrayal," which he views as a major explanatory
tool for American products liability law. 70 It seems fitting that this
should be the first consideration in a definition of the core concept of
liability for product-caused injuries. This is so because a twin of "our
age of increasing technicality" is the development of modern techniques
of consumer persuasion.
Allied with this focus on product portrayal-which this writer
believes is the logical foundation for the rest of the defect concept-is
the notion of "the safety which a person is entitled to expect."' 7 1 The
drafters made a clear choice here. Not only did they define the concept
of defect by consumer safety expectations in the text of the Directive;
they underlined that point in the Preamble and in doing so they specifi-
cally eschewed the concept of "fitness for use."'7 2
The exclusion of any idea of fitness removes the consumer protec-
tion ideal of the Directive entirely from the realm of commercial law
concepts. Conspicuous by their absence are notions of cost-benefit and
risk-utility analysis, and ideas of the cheapest cost-avoider and the best
comparer of costs. 73 Most remarkable, however, is the adoption of the
consumer expectations test itself, in the face of the dismissiveness of its
critics, who have referred to "the uninformed safety expectations" of
uninformed consumers." 7 4
2. Interpretative Questions
With the inquiry thus focused on consumer expectations, the American
experience indicates that several questions will arise. One issue would
be whether the concept is basically an empirical one, or one primarily
founded in normative considerations. The language of entitlement in
both the text and the preamble indicates that the focus is more philo-
70. Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
71. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
72. Id. pmbl. para. 6.
73. For a different perspective, see Jorg Finsinger & Jurgen Simon, An Economic
Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and the Product Liability Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PRE-
VENTION AND COMPENSATION FOR LossEs 185, 202-05 (Michael Faure & Roger van
den Bergh eds., 1989). These authors develop an "informational product defect"
concept that stresses the "sovereignty of the informed consumer," and his or her
ability to choose risks that have been communicated.
74. See, e.g., 2 ALI Reporters' Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury: Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change 44 (1991). Cf. James A. Hen-
derson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1532-34 (1992) (advocating "reasonable-
ness as the governing standard for liability in design defect and failure to warn
cases," and saying that "even courts that apply a consumer-expectation test"-"[t]he
only serious alternative" to a "reasonableness" standard-"rarely do so without tem-
pering it with significant risk utility balancing").
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sophical than factual. Presumably the court must make a judgment
about "the safety which a person is entitled to expect."" 5
This judicial task may pose serious problems of interpretation, com-
plicated by traditions differing between common law judges and civil-
ians. As a general matter, it would seem that what one is "entitled to
expect" depends on a complex set of factors, including evolving social
mores, improving product standards, and how particular product cate-
gories have been presented to the public.
Full circle, this seemingly normative standard may even draw on
data concerning what people do expect. Because of America's almost
universal use of juries in injury cases, interesting grist for the mill of
comparative law appears in judicial efforts to establish distinctions
between the role of judge and jury. Illustrative is Justice Goodwin's
opinion for the Oregon Supreme Court in Heaton v. Ford Motor Co. ,76 in
which he was at pains to distinguish two issues. The first was the ques-
tion of "what reasonable consumers do expect from the product," which
he said was a "basically factual question" for the jury.7 7 The other was
the question of "how strong products should be," which he said that
courts had decided was "strong enough to perform as the ordinary con-
sumer expects."'8
In the European Community, which generally lacks the jury tradi-
tion of the United States, courts will have to decide how they will sepa-
rate, and integrate, these questions of "fact" and philosophy.
It is relevant to note a difference between the language of Article 6
and the preamble as to whose expectations the court must assess. The
preamble speaks of "the safety which the public at large is entitled to
expect." Article 6, however, refers to "the safety which a person is enti-
tled to expect."
If the language of the preamble colors the text, then the question
would appear to be a relatively objective one, or at least one dependent
on the opinions of substantial majorities. Dr. Hans Taschner, a leading
figure in the drafting of the Directive, has said that the question is not
one "of the individual injured party with his subjective expectations,"
nor even of "the expectations of a specific group of consumers," but of
"what the community as a whole considers to be right."'79 If we focus on
the language of Article 6 alone, however, we must consider a potentially
subjective interpretation centering on individual claimants.
The point is no quibble. It links up with a range of issues tied in
with the question of whether to judge consumer conduct on an objective
or subjective basis. Embodied in that question is the classic distinction
75. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
76. 435 P.2d 806, 809 (Or. 1967).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Hans C. Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, in EEC STRIcT
LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUcT LIABILITY RULES 83, 89 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 371, 1988).
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between the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
in their traditional American applications. More relevantly to the plain-
tiff's case in chief, the point relates to issues involving duties to warn,
which in the American law have often focused on the knowledge of the
individual claimant.
C. Potential Defect Issues
The Directive does not speak specifically to a flock of other issues con-
cerning defect that have arisen in the American decisions. We shall dis-
cuss here some of the most salient ones, which may provide a basis for
reference in controversies arising under the Directive.
1. Time and Character of Knowledge
An important set of questions has to do with the time and character of
the defendant's knowledge of the hazardous aspect of the product. An
American judicial pronouncement that captures the unadorned concept
of strict liability focuses on whether a reasonable person would have
marketed the product "if he had knowledge of its harmful character."80 Using
this idea of deemed knowledge, the Oregon Supreme Court defined the
question as whether the "seller would be negligent if he sold the article
knowing of the risk involved." 81
Dean Keeton put the question as one of whether the product would
"subject someone to an unreasonable risk in fact."8 2 Defining the issue that
way, one presumably would test the question of defect on the basis of
information available at the time of trial, rather than only on the basis of
knowledge obtainable at the time of marketing.83
These formulations of the issue draw a rather sharp line between
negligence and liability without fault. They would be relatively noncon-
troversial in practically all products cases involving defects principally
associated with the manufacturing process. The matter generates more
spirited theoretical argument with respect to "unknowable" risks of
products, which we discuss below. 84
2. Ordinary Products
Another cluster of issues arises around a set of intuitively appealing
ideas related to the general notion that consumers must take life as they
find it. Some of the simplest of these cases concern dangers built into
the most ordinary kinds of products. A homely example appears in the
Illinois Supreme Court's declaration that shoes that become slippery
when wet are not defective as a matter of law.8 5 An analogous holding
80. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974).
81. Id.
82. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv.
398, 409 (1970).
83. See id. at 407.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 129-44.
85. Fanning v. Lemay, 230 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1967).
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involving a technological product came from another Illinois court,
which declared that "the fact that all vehicles will skid (and are subject to
uncontrollable skidding) on ice or other slippery surfaces does not per
se make them an unreasonably dangerous product."8 6
3. Obviousness
A conceptual cluster that recently has occupied a growing niche in the
American case law is evident in another observation in the decision just
quoted. Saying that "[s]kidding on ice is a phenomenon necessarily
known to anyone after he first walks or rides on it," that court referred
to a "common propensity of the product which is open and obvious.8 7
Variations on the "obviousness" defense have come to the fore in a
range of product contexts. Courts have employed them under a variety
of doctrinal labels, including not only defect but duty to warn. Another
Illinois decision invoked obviousness in refusing to impose liability in
favor of a plaintiff who was thrown off a motorcycle.8 8 When a stack of
glass cooking bowls and lids tumbled out of a cabinet, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court thought it "obvious that a consumer or user should be
aware of the potential hazards of stacking glass or cookware objects in a
pyramid." 8 9
Denying recovery on claims brought under the rubric of duty to
warn, courts have utilized "obviousness" locutions in a group of cases
involving dives into shallow water in residential swimming pools. In one
of the most fiercely contested of these cases, a majority of the Michigan
Supreme Court said that "[t]he danger involved in diving into shallow
water" was "obvious to the reasonably prudent user" of an above-
ground pool, observing that "[t]he admonition 'feet first' is a matter of
common knowledge where shallow water or water of an unknown depth
is involved." 90
Courts also have frequently applied an obviousness defense in cases
involving industrial machines. For example, in a case in which the oper-
ator of a press brake had both hands crushed in the machine, the court
said that "it was obvious to him that if a person placed any part of his
body between the moveable ram and the press brake bed, and the foot
pedal was pressed, that person would be injured." 9' Another court
86. Zidek v. General Motors Corp., 384 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
87. Id. at 512.
88. Miller v. Dvomik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
89. Jackson v. Coming Glass Works, 538 A.2d 666, 669 (R.I. 1988).
90. Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., Inc., 462 N.W.2d 348, 358
(Mich. 1990) (plurality). The court reaffirmed this view in Glittenberg v. Wilcenski,
491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992), referring repeatedly to obviousness terminology. Id.
at 213-18. For example, the court invoked "the well-established rule that there is no
duty to warn of dangers that are open and obvious," id. at 214, and declared that
"the obvious nature of the danger serves the exact function as a warning that the risk
is present." Id. at 215.
91. Bell v. Wysong & Miles Co., 531 N.E.2d 267, 269 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988), rev.
denied, 536 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1989).
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applied the concept to low ceilings, finding no duty to warn a worker
who was riding a mobile car that he could hit his head on an overhead
platform. 9 2
With factual and doctrinal variations like these, the idea of obvi-
ousness becomes a surrogate for a set of legal intuitions. Whether the
question emerges theoretically as one of defect, duty to warn, or con-
tributory fault, courts that use this terminology seem to be centering on
the moral strength of the plaintiff's case, which they find wanting. Pre-
sumably European courts could fit all of this into the concept of what "a
person is entitled to expect."' 93 The rubric of obviousness provides one
linguistic avenue into the normative aspects of that entitlement.
4. Dangerous "Good" Product
Two other concepts, somewhat overlapping in their defensive
trenchworks, may commend themselves to the courts of the Community
states. These are the idea of the dangerous "good" product and that of
the "unavoidably unsafe" product.
Comment i to section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
captured the first idea with its observation that "[m]any products cannot
possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug
necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consump-
tion."' 94 Setting as the standard a consumer contemplation test, the
comment referred to "[g]ood whiskey"-"not unreasonably dangerous
merely because it will make some people drunk"; "[g]ood tobacco"-
"not unreasonably dangerous because the effects of smoking may be
harmful"; and "[glood butter"-"not unreasonably dangerous merely
because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and
leads to heart attacks."9 5
Although the case law of the time indicated that the concept of
"good tobacco" would prevail,9 6 some recent decisions have at least
challenged that notion. In the most discussed of these cases, the Third
Circuit refused to affirm a denial of a claim based on a "generic risk-
utility" theory.9 7 It thought that, in the context of state law, there was
insufficient evidence "that the 'inherent[ly] [dangerous] characteristics'
of cigarettes were known to the 'ordinary consumer or user' " before the
time of the federal cigarette labeling legislation.9 8 The United States
92. Hart v. FMC Corp., 446 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
93. Compare Alpa, supra note 26, at 254 ("[t]he Italian text... insists on the mani-
fest characteristics of the product, in order to avoid the user, once aware of the inher-
ent dangers of the product, making claims against these said dangers").
94. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
97. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
98. See id. at 578. But cf Roysdon v. Rj. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230
236 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs "offered no proof that [defendant's] cigarettes were
'improperly manufactured' or contained 'dangerous impurities' ").
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Supreme Court's review of the case produced a decision permitting
claims for "express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation,
or conspiracy." 99
The new clouds over this issue have shadowed the intuition in com-
ment i, formerly so seemingly secure. The language of Article 6 of the
Directive on consumer expectations roughly parallels that of comment
i's consumer contemplation test. But we must await judgment about
how Community courts will put flesh on the bones of that rather bare
language.
At least prospectively, the question may depend on regulatory
choices that the Community makes concerning the labeling and advertis-
ing of tobacco. The issue of liability for injuries due to smoking in the
past will also require policy choices. Will Community courts bow to a
history in which the question has not been litigated, to their own admin-
istrative convenience, and to a suspicion that, after all, most smokers
know that tobacco is deadly? Or will the Directive's repeated references
to consumer protection provide an opening wedge for consumers to sue
for tobacco-caused illness? At this point, we can only ask the questions.
5. Unavoidably Unsafe Product
The related defensive earthwork is that of the "unavoidably unsafe
product." Restatement comment k provides the basis for discussion
here. Focusing on drugs and vaccines as examples, the comment
declares that certain products are, "in the present state of human knowl-
edge, . . . quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use."' 00
Numerous issues have arisen in American litigation focusing on this
problem. One, linchpinned to American use of the jury, is the question
of when courts should allow jurors to make a factual determination
under that Restatement test.101 Another is the question of where the
burden of proof lies. 10 2
With many products for which a comment k defense would be
offered, it might be difficult to apply a test based on actual consumer
expectations because of the technology involved in product formulation.
However, the reference in Article 6 to "the safety which a person is enti-
tled to expect" seems fairly plastic with reference to this problem.
If, in fact, a product is "incapable" of being made safer "in the pres-
ent state of human knowledge,"' 1 3 then presumably a consumer is not
entitled to expect more. Moreover, the language of comment k aligns it
99. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625 (1992).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
101. For a balanced discussion of this point, see Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781-82 (R.I. 1988) (answering certified question).
102. See, e.g., Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding comment k to be "an affirmative defense").
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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with the "development risk" defense of Article 7(e), discussed below. 10 4
6. Expected Use
a. Generally
Among the few specific guidelines that the Directive provides for defin-
ing defect is "the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be put."' 10 5 Besides opening up a possible defense of
misuse, this language presents a rich set of definitional issues.
One of the more intricate sets of questions in this regard arises con-
cerning products specifically designed for multiple purposes. In this
connection, we already have discussed some potential applications of
Article 7(f) of the Directive, which exonerates component manufacturers
when a defect is attributable to the assembler's design or instruc-
tions. 106 The language of Article 6 on reasonably expectable use may
also apply in such cases.
In an illustrative case, the defendant made limit switches used in a
die casting machine. Although the defendant argued that it had never
sold its product directly to the plaintiff's employer, the court focused on
evidence that the defendant was aware that its switches were being pro-
vided to the employer. Drawing on an affidavit by a mechanical engi-
neer that the defendant should have warned users about the dangers
involved in the use of limit switches in die casting machines, the court
held that the plaintiff had created a fact question on the defendant's
"knowledge of the particular purpose" for which the employer used the
switches.' 0 7
Another decision about type of use in a typical industrial setting
focused on the manufacturer of the completed product. In this case, a
worker sued the maker of a press. An Illinois appellate court held
against the plaintiff, who had given no evidence that the machine "could
have reasonably been fitted with safety guards at the point of opera-
tion."108 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, however. It drew on
testimony by an expert to the effect that the defendant "should have
ascertained whether [the industrial user] intended to use the press for a
single purpose or for multiple purposes."' 0 9 Challenging the appellate
court's declaration that "the press was a general purpose machine," the
supreme court said that the issue "of whether the press was multifunc-
tional or unifunctional . . . was a question of fact for the jury to
resolve."' 10
104. See infra text accompanying notes 123-44.
105. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(b).
106. See supra text accompanying note 27.
107. Oliver v. Namco Controls, 161 A.D.2d 1188, 1189, 556 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431
(1990).
108. Savage Mfg. & Sales, Inc. v. Doser, 540 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Il. App. Ct. 1989).
109. Doser v. Savage Mfg. & Sales, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Ill. 1990) (quoting
lower court, 540 N.E.2d at 405).
110. Id. at 824.
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b. Balancing of Factors
In civilian proceedings as well as common law litigation in which the
issue of expected use arises, essentially factual questions of this sort will
arise to complicate judicial life. The issue will depend on many factors
related to the specificity of knowledge of both sellers and purchasers,
and to particular industrial and domestic realities.
The issue of expectable use itself overlaps with two categories dis-
cussed above-those of the dangerous "good" product 1 1 and the
"unavoidably unsafe" product. 1 12 In all these cases, the law must
resolve tensions between the desire of the consumer to obtain a product
that will do a particular job at a certain price, and the competing
requirements of safety.
An evocative decision dealt with a pipe-hook, a product used in
loading pipe from a ship into a barge. The pipe-hook at issue did not
detain some pipe when it was let down, and a 7,000-pound pipe rolled
into the plaintiff after it was mislaid by a crane. Rejecting the argument
that "ease of removal of a pipe-hook" was a design defect, the court said
that that quality was a "desirable" one "in some uses, especially for tier-
stacking of pipes so high that workers would have to climb upon the
pipes to release a hook that was not easy to remove." ' 1 3
Given that a design alternative proposed by the plaintiff would not
have given workers the flexibility provided by the defendant's product,
the court concluded that there was no design defect. It said that the
risks of the defendant's product were "not shown to be unreasonably
disproportionate to the risks avoided (and other benefits obtained)." ' 14
The decision underlines the fact that when there are certain jobs to
be done, the opportunity for safety is often severely constrained. An
important question for Community courts, as for American courts, is
what conceptual focus to bring to bear on such questions. Given the
language of the Directive, the question often will be phrased as one of
reasonably expected use. But in many cases, the defendant may really
be arguing, in effect, that the product is unavoidably unsafe in the con-
text of its use, a la comment k, or that it "cannot possibly be made safe
for all consumption," a la comment i.
Behind all such cases there is a question that is unavoidably norma-
tive: how far should the law go in deciphering bargains about product
safety, and in judging their fairness?
7. Crashworthiness
We can only hint at the complexities of another set of questions that
arguably fall under the heading of expectable use. These are the issues
I 11. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
113. Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d 816, 818 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
114. Id. at 819.
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classified as those of "crashworthiness" in American law, usually arising
in the motor vehicle context.
Two decisions by United States courts of appeals in the 1960s cabin
the main argument. In one, the Seventh Circuit denied liability for inju-
ries to auto passengers that allegedly were enhanced by the failure of the
vehicle to protect its occupants adequately in a collision. The court rea-
soned that it was not "the intended purpose of an automobile" to "par-
ticipat[e] in collisions."' 15
The Eighth Circuit took the opposite position, and prevailed, set-
ting up a virtual cottage industry of crashworthiness litigation.
Although it conceded that "automobiles are not made for the purpose
of colliding with each other," that court focused on the fact that "a fre-
quent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in
collisions and injury-producing impacts."' 1 6 In that statistical context,
the court could find no reason to distinguish injuries involving "the so-
called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the
automobile" from those occurring when "the defect in design or manu-
facture was the causative factor of the accident." ' 17
Although European courts may decide that they do not wish to
involve themselves in crashworthiness jurisprudence, the fact is that the
language of the Directive is capable of housing the view of reality of
either the Seventh Circuit or the Eighth Circuit. It certainly is "reason-
able" for a manufacturer to expect that a driver will not "put" a vehicle
to the "use" of a collision. But any automotive designer who hears the
morning traffic reports knows that he or she "reasonably" must expect
that vehicles will be "put" "to" the test of collisions.
D. Impact of Technological Improvement
A major set of problems that confronts courts in products liability cases,
combining features of both fairness and incentives, arises from techno-
logical improvement. On the one hand, we wish to goad manufacturers
of risky products to do the very best they can from a safety standpoint,
including research into ways to make their goods safer. On the other
hand, we must account for the benefits conferred by the early units in a
developing product line. The problem is to strike a balance, one whose
incentives drive the manufacturer far enough to inspire safer products,
and also one perceived as fair. Fairness in this sense includes the manu-
facturer's perception that the law does not call upon it to do the impossi-
ble, and the consumer's belief that the law is not accepting a level of
safety just because it was the standard of a lazy industry.
The drafters of the Directive evidently recognized this as a major
problem, for no fewer than three substantive provisions speak to it. One
115. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
116. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
117. Id.
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of those provisions proved so controversial that the Directive allows
member States to opt out of its strictures.
1. Time of Marketing; State of the Art
Article 6 includes two related declarations on the subject. One clause,
in Article 6(1)(c), describes one of the "circumstances" for considera-
tion of "the safety which a person is entitled to expect" as being "the
time when the product was put into circulation."' " s Immediately fol-
lowing that, the Directive announces in Article 6(2) that "[a] product
shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better prod-
uct is subsequently put into circulation." '" 9
Taken together, these provisions give the manufacturer a split
message: You will not be penalized only for doing better on later
attempts, but you had better be rigorous on the first try. There is a
decided undertone of fault in these provisions, one with moral harmon-
ics. The Directive seeks to insure that just doing better in later models is
not grounds for liability. At the same time, it may be read to indicate
that "the safety which a person is entitled to expect" refers to the ability
of the manufacturer, at any time in the process of design, to visualize the
product in use and to formulate safety improvements.
The language of the Directive may not have the crispness of a quan-
titatively stated classification system. However, before strict liability
became an articulated standard for products cases-and indeed pres-
ently-this level of abstraction has been a hallmark of negligence law.
Indeed, the specificity of reference to temporal considerations in the
Directive is more precise than the general negligence standard in the
United States.
It would appear that these two provisions comprise an analogue to
what is popularly called the "state of the art" defense. Since there are
several different meanings for the term in American law,' 20 the effort to
get to the root of the problem to which that label refers is
commendable.
The Directive seems to eschew the meaning most likely to appeal to
product makers, that of "customary industry practice. '121 Yet the elas-
tic character of the language in Article (6)(1)(c), "the time when the
product was put into circulation," appears to give more room for
maneuver to entrepreneurs than the definition of "state of the art" as
"the aggregate of product-related knowledge existing at any point in
time." 122
118. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(c).
119. Id. art. 6(2).
120. See 1 SHAPO, supra note 7, 10.01 at page S10-1 (1992 Supp.).
121. See Edward C. Sohota, Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the
Art Defense, 43 ALB. L. REV. 941, 945-46 (1979).
122. See id. at 946.
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2. The "Development Risk" Defense
a. Generally
The most controversial feature of the Directive that is related to tempo-
ral considerations is the so-called "development risk" defense in Article
7(e). That clause exonerates a producer if "the state of scientific and
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation
was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be
discovered." 123
There is a potential comer for "state of the art" argument in the
"development risk" clause. Illustrative is a 1990 decision of the Sixth
Circuit in a case involving DTP vaccine. The plaintiff in this case
attacked the defendant's use of a whole cell design at a time when
another, acellular vaccine was "in wide use in Japan.'" 24 The court
granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, however, pointing out
that "[t]he relative effectiveness of the acellular design is only beginning
to be understood."' 2 5 The court also noted that the acellular vaccine
was not recommended for children under two, "the time of greatest
risk."1 26
One might classify this holding under the rubric of "state of the
art."' 12 7 However, it would seem that the decision also fits comfortably
under the concept that "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time" of marketing did not "enable the existence of the defect to be
discovered."' 28 The case is an interesting one conceptually, since
123. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(e). In what reportedly was a "last-minute revi-
sion," the Greek legislature opted to exonerate producers who "justifiably did not
know or could not know" of a defect. See Elisa Alexandridou, The Greek Consumer
Protection Act 1991, 1992 EUR. CONSUMER LJ. 20, 23 (commenting that "'t]his defini-
tion is... inconsistent with the Directive in that it establishes a subjective criterion,
making the defence much broader than the state-of-the-art defence").
124. Ackley v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 919 F.2d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 1990).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. In an important early analysis of the Directive, Simon Whittaker flatly
referred to "the state of the art defence of Article 7(e)." See Simon Whittaker, The
EEC Directive on Product Liability, 5 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 233, 254 (1985), elaborating the
idea that Article 7(e) "is a version of what has become known, particularly in
America, as the defence of the state of the art." See id. at 257-60.
128. Cf Christopher Newdick, Risk, Uncertainty and "Knowledge" in the Development
Risk Defence, 20 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REv. 309, 325-26 (1991), analyzing the United
Kingdom's development risk clause in section 4(l)(e) of the Consumer Protection
Act 1987. This Section provides for a defense if the producer shows "that the state
of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a pro-
ducer of products of the same description as the product in question might be
expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they
were under his control." Newdick comments that, "given the danger presented by
many products, the duty to research across a broad spectrum of literature ought not
to be difficult to establish." He observes that "[a] wide range of scientific disciplines
may possess information that ought reasonably to be known to a particular pro-
ducer." Id. at 325. Newdick concludes that "[i]n effect the producer ought to be
familiar with and sensitive to the foremost scientific developments in his field" and
that "given the time it takes for research findings to be verified and accepted by the
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although an alternative product existed, the knowledge of its compara-
tive effectiveness was, in fact, in a state of "development."
b. Question of Unknowable Risks
At the heart of the controversy surrounding Article 7(e) is the question
of whether product makers may be held liable for risks unknowable at
the time of marketing. The idea that they should be liable is perhaps the
most striking theoretical implication of the pure conception of strict lia-
bility. One might argue, indeed, that such a case is at the heart of the
concept. If the "existence of the defect" could be "discovered," then
the case begins to have a smell of negligence. Therefore, the quintes-
sential strict liability case is the one in which there was no way, at the
time of marketing, to search out information that, later discovered, gave
a color of defect to the product. 129
The Illinois Supreme Court fully recognized this point in its deci-
sion in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital.'3 0 The court in Cun-
ningham applied a strict liability principle to a case of transfusion
hepatitis. Though since overruled by the Illinois legislature, the deci-
sion stands as one of the principal formulations of strict liability for
unknowable risks. The court specifically rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that it should escape liability because in "the state of medical sci-
ence ... there are absolutely no means by which the existence of serum
hepatitis virus can be detected in whole blood."''
The court drew on the plain language of Restatement section 402A,
applying that section's rule that imposes strict liability "although ... the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."' 3 2 The nub of the court's argument appeared in its declara-
tion that "[t]o allow a defense to strict liability on the ground that there
is no way, either practical or theoretical, for a defendant to ascertain the
existence of impurities in his product would be to emasculate the doc-
trine and in a very real sense would signal a return to a negligence
theory."' 3 3
As a matter of the logic of the doctrine, Cunningham enforces a truly
strict liability. By contrast, the development risk clause drives a substan-
tial theoretical wedge into strict liability. Some of the most interesting
questions about the potential effects of the clause are empirical, but they
are linked closely to the ultimate judgmental issue.
relevant scientific community, it would be inexcusable to fail to possess the 'knowl-
edge' of the most advanced researchers." Id. at 326.
129. Cf. W. Page Keeton, Products Liabilit)--Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L.
REV. 398, 407-09 (1970) (proposing rule imposing liability when "the sale of a prod-
uct is made under circumstances that would subject someone to an unreasonable risk
in fact," regardless of whether the defendant was "excusably unaware of the extent of
the danger and had not committed any negligent act").
130. 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
131. Id. at 902.
132. Id. at 899.
133. Id. at 902.
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One important question is whether, in practice, the development
risk would make very much difference in the cases that actually come up
for decision. It is not clear that it would. The tempest over the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp. 13 4 indicates why.
Beshada provoked a storm of criticism with its holding of strict liabil-
ity, under the heading of failure to warn, in an asbestos case. The court
emphasized that "[f]ailure to warn of a risk which one could not have
known existed is not unreasonable conduct."' 13 5 It was not "saying what
defendants should have done"; that was an issue of "negligence."' 136
What the court was saying was "that defendants' products were not rea-
sonably safe because they did not have a warning. Without a warning,
users of the product were unaware of its hazards and could not protect
themselves from injury."' 137
To the uninitiated, the court had created a conundrum. It had
imposed a tort liability for failing to do something that could not have
been done. But that is not the logic of Beshada's liability for "duty to
warn." The "duty to warn" theory is simply a vehicle for the imposition
of a true strict liability. The principal vice of the manufacturer's market-
ing of the product might be its failure to convey information. But the
point is that, under strict liability, the manufacturer must be held liable
for injuries caused by the product's hazards, even though it exercised
"all possible care" in the entire process of marketing, including the pro-
vision of information.
To those whose tort world pivots on a fault-based morality, Beshada
would have effected the miscarriage of justice of which critics com-
plained, and which the adoption of the "development risk" defense
implied. Yet in the particular context of the asbestos decisions that have
taken the Beshada position, 138 it would seem that the criticism is over-
stated and perhaps even misplaced.
Though these decisions have applied a strict liability theory, they
have done so in a setting where there has been plenty of evidence of
culpability. Illustrative is Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 13 a decision just
three years after Beshada in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed a punitive damages award. The court emphasized "that in a
strict-liability, failure-to-warn case involving exposure to asbestos or
asbestos products, plaintiffs are not precluded from introducing evi-
dence relating to defendants' knowledge or conduct as it may be rele-
vant to other aspects of the case, including punitive damages."140
134. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
135. Id. at 549.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See e.g.,Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548 (Haw. 1987); In
re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233 (D. Haw. 1988).
139. 512 A.2d 466 (NJ. 1986).
140. Id. at 473.
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Other courts have referred to the increasing evidence of knowledge
available to asbestos firms as long ago as the 1930s. A Maryland deci-
sion, for example, adduced an article on pulmonary asbestosis in a 1930
issue of Asbestos Magazine, a publication in which Johns-Manville adver-
tised, to support the claim that "Johns-Manville knew or should have
known of the contents of this article."' 14 The court also invoked a
report to employees of a defendant firm by one of the company's sales-
men, who described an article on asbestos and said that "[i]f you think
mineral wool is dangerous you should read this."' 14 2 An important legal
conclusion appears in a Fifth Circuit decision, dealing with the admissi-
bility of the so-called Sumner Simpson Papers, which declared that "the
scientific knowledge of one manufacturer may help the plaintiff prove
that the dangers of asbestos were discoverable at the time of the plain-
tiff's exposure."' 43
These observations do not refute the arguments made against pure
strict liability on unfairness grounds, or indeed on economic
grounds.' 4 4 They simply point out that as applied in the controversial
setting of asbestos cases, a strict liability articulated to cover unknow-
able risks has turned out to be liability for extremely culpable conduct.
One might add that the application of strict liability for allegedly
unknowable risks may, in some cases, embrace conduct where the risks
were knowable but it would be prohibitive for the plaintiffs to prove
that. This presents another empirical question, which would be difficult
to answer: whether the application of strict liability will principally catch
those cases or will penalize a substantial number of manufacturers who
are truly faultless.
c. Derogation Provision
The sum of this discussion, perhaps, is that the "development risk"
defense may be more thunder than lightning. Yet the defense was suffi-
ciently controversial that the Directive allows states to derogate from
it,145 recognizing that some states might believe that it "restrict[s]
unduly the protection of the consumer."' 14 6 The Directive indicates the
seriousness of such an action by specifically requiring any state that
wishes to do so to "communicate the text" of its derogation to the Com-
mission, which "shall inform the other Member States."' 14 7
The Directive further requires that a State attempting to derogate
must submit to a nine-month waiting period, unless the Commission
141. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 248, (Md. App. Ct. 1990).
142. Id.
143. King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990).
144. See, e.g., Finsinger & Simon, supra note 73, at 207 (making manufacturers lia-
ble can prevent damages only if their "assessment of the advantage of greater safety
and the disadvantages of greater costs takes place under a situation of better informa-
tion than the assessment by the buyer").
145. Directive, supra note 1, art. 15(1)(b).
146. Id. pmbl. para. 16.
147. Id. art. 15(2).
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presents to the Council "a proposal amending this Directive on the rele-
vant matter."1 48 However, it allows the derogating state to implement
its proposed measure if the Commission does not advise it within three
months that "it intends submitting such a proposal to the Council."' 149
If the Commission does submit an amendment to the Council, the State
proposing to derogate must wait for 18 months. 150
d. Review Provision
Accenting the Council's cautious approach to the question is the fact
that the Directive specifically mandates a review after ten years of the
development risk provision, any derogating provisions, and relevant
judicial decisions. The standard for review is the effect of this body of
law "on consumer protection and the functioning of the common mar-
ket," and the Directive provides that the Council shall utilize the Com-
mission's report on the subject to "decide whether to repeal Article
7(e)." 15 1 The Preamble expresses the belief-is it a hope?-that sub-
jecting a derogation to "a Community stand-still procedure" would be
done "in order to raise, if possible, the level of protection in a uniform
manner throughout the Community."' 15 2
If there should develop a substantial body of case law on the sub-
ject, the Council will have to decide whether the defense causes more
unjust results than just ones. If the American experience is instructive,
however, it may be that the Council will find that the "development risk"
defense is a partygoer that is all dressed up with no place to dance.
VUI. Warnings
A. Definitional Questions
One rather remarkable lacuna in the Directive is the lack of specific ref-
erence to liability for failure to warn of product hazards, although a
principal drafter of the Directive has suggested that the language con-
cerning "presentation of the product" in Article 6(1) (a) provides a basis
for liability based on lack of warnings. 153 At least one other clause in
Article 6(1), referring to "the safety which a person is entitled to
expect,"' 154 may provide an interpretative basis for decisions on warn-
ings issues. It is true that the text of Restatement section 402A itself
does not refer specifically to warnings, but the adoption of that section
preceded the principal body of American judicial decisions on the sub-
ject. In any event, the development of the American case law makes it
evident that this will continue to be a prominent set of issues. If any-
148. Id
149. It
150. Id.
151. Id. art. 15(3).
152. Id pmbl. para. 16.
153. See Taschner, supra note 79, at 95-96.
154. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
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thing, litigation on warnings problems has increased in the last few
years.' 55
B. Potential Issues
Certainly, it appears that Community courts will have to consider the
application of the Directive to suits based on failure to warn. In this
Article, we can begin to identify only some of the issues that may arise.
In our discussion of the development risk defense above,' 56 we hinted
at one important issue. This is whether states derogating from the
defense would apply a true strict liability for failure to warn in situations
in which the defendant could not have known at the relevant time the
information on which a warning should be based.
We may briefly advert to some other warnings issues, salient for
Europe, on which the American experience provides points of reference:
(1) European courts, or amendments to the Directive, should
make clear the distinction between instructions and warnings.
(2) Community lawmakers will have to confront questions involv-
ing the duty to warn the so-called "sophisticated user."
(3) Numerous problems will arise with respect to the locus of the
duty among members of the distributional chain. An illustrative ques-
tion, tied in with the "sophisticated user" problem, relates to the extent
of the obligation of firms like chemical suppliers to provide direct warn-
ings to employees of companies that are the direct purchasers of their
products. The Community presumably will also have to formulate rules
for the division of legal responsibility between pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and providers of medical care.
(4) Community judges will face many issues concerning adequacy
of warning that are irreducibly questions of fact. Some of these ques-
tions will lie in the overlap between the traditional requirement that a
failure to warn must be material to the consumer's decision and the
Directive's mandate that the plaintiff must show "the causal relationship
between defect and damage."
(5) There also will arise issues in another potential area of concep-
tual overlap: between questions about the "duty to warn" and problems
of what American courts call "misuse." We have indicated above some
language in the Directive that might ground a "misuse" defense. 157
C. Modes of Argument: The Uses of Power and Information Costs
Two sets of discourse frequently run parallel to one another, but some-
times cross paths, in the duty to warn area. One concerns the use of
155. Decisions on this question have constituted one of the biggest sets of addi-
tions to recent Supplements to the writer's products liability treatise. See 1 SHAPO,
supra note 7, ch. 19 (in Supps. 1991, 1992).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 123-44.
157. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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power. It entails the argument that, from an ethical standpoint, the pos-
session of information itself imposes obligations.
A seemingly more precise sort of dialogue deals with information
costs. The focus here is at least implicitly quantitative: on weighing the
costs of providing information against the costs of products injuries.
This approach to the problem has generated competing lines of
argument.
Some judges have focused on the relatively trivial monetary cost of
adding cautionary words or symbols to product labeling or literature.
Illustrative is an Alaska case in which an infant became severely dehy-
drated after being fed a glucose and water solution, intended principally
as a food supplement, which was dangerous to infants if it was not suffi-
ciently diluted. The manufacturer sold other products, meant for
infants, in the same kind of bottle. The retailer placed the solution on
its baby product shelf. Holding that there was a fact question of whether
there should have been a warning that the product should not be fed to
infants, the Alaska Supreme Court said that "[t]he cost of giving an ade-
quate warning is usually so minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more
printing to a label, that the balance must always be struck in favor of the
obligation to warn where there is a substantial danger which will not be
recognized by the ordinary user."' 58
A decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
presented a contrasting point of view on an allegation that a firm should
have put a more explicit warning on propane cylinders about their
"explosive, as well as flammable" nature. 159 Analyzing the argument
that it is very cheap to include extra bits of information in warnings, the
federal court emphasized that "[t]he primary cost is, in fact, the increase
in time and effort required for the user to grasp the message." 160 Each
time one adds an extra item, the court said, it "dilutes the punch of
every other item" and pieces of information "get lost in fine print."'16 1
These two cases, taken together, provide a sense of the parameters
of the problem. The decision in the gas cylinder case provides a coun-
terweight to the food supplement case. Community courts will have to
take both points of view into account. Yet, in considering the "dilution"
argument, they must also reflect on its ramifications. For, carried to its
fullest implications, the argument would appear to suggest that the
more dangers a product presents, the less likely it may be that the manu-
facturer will be liable for injuries caused by those hazards.
VIH. Defenses
In addition to the concept of the "development risk," 162 and defenses
158. Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986).
159. Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
160. Id. at 937.
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 123-44.
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based on the consumer's conduct,' 6 3 the Directive provides several dis-
crete defenses focused on the product.
A. Product Not Put in Circulation
A threshold point is that producers will escape liability if they "did not
put the product into circulation."' 16 4 Though this may seem a most
obvious point, there still may be room for interpretation. For example,
the question would arise whether a demonstration of a product consti-
tutes putting it into circulation. In a case dealing with the demonstra-
tion of a defective aircraft, the Alabama Supreme Court applied its
specialized products liability doctrine. Emphasizing the existence of the
''profit motive," the court said that the manufacturer was "in a better
position to know and correct defects in his product and as between him
and his prospective consumers should bear the risk of injury... when
... defects enter the market uncorrected."1 6 5
When the injured user of a product has a professional interest in its
development, courts are likely to exonerate the manufacturer. This cat-
egory would include people who aid in the actual process of product
development, for example, a man who ran a glass manufacturing busi-
ness in his garage and contracted to help in the development of a glass-
spinning machine. A New Jersey court, confronted with this claimant's
allegation that the machine did not have adequate safety devices, said it
would be "senseless" to apply strict liability and that it would "deter the
development of new products and processes."166
Another decision denied recovery when a test driver for a tire pro-
ducer was killed by a tire blowout. What made this Texas case a close
one was that the defective tire was what is called a "non-interest spare,"
a tire used on the test vehicle from the manufacturer's ordinary con-
sumer stock but one that was not being tested. The Texas Supreme
Court, saying that "the product must be released in some manner to the
consuming public" in order to justify liability, emphasized that the sued-
upon tire, "although not itself the subject of the test, always remained
within the industrial, testing process."' 6 7
This case appears to stand at the margin, because the tire in ques-
tion was of a kind sold across the country for general use. Arguably, the
question essentially is one of consumerhood. Given the pervasive
emphasis of the Directive on "protection of the consumer," such a deci-
sion would seem justifiable in Europe on the basis that a test driver sim-
ply is not a consumer.
One might argue the case the other way, for the test driver's posi-
tion relative to the non-interest spare was exactly that of any purchaser
163. See infra text accompanying notes 204-14.
164. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(a).
165. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 365 So. 2d 966, 968 (Ala.
1978).
166. Woods v. Leurtzing Corp., 400 A.2d 562, 566 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979).
167. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376-77 (Tex. 1978).
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from a tire store, both as to his possession of information and his ability
to protect himself against injury. But the premise underlying the deci-
sion seems to be that one must consider all the tires, including the non-
interest spare, as a package within the test driver's job. Working from
that foundation, it would be illogical to call a test driver a consumer
relative to a package of automotive products involved in his work.
B. Defect Not Existing When Product Marketed
The Directive also protects a producer from liability when "it is prob-
able that the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time
when the product was put into circulation by him or that this defect
came into being afterwards."' 68 These overlapping clauses appear sim-
ply to reinforce the basic opposition to arbitrary liabilities that one finds
in most legal systems.
C. Not Manufactured for Sale or Distribution
A more potentially controversial provision is the Directive's exoneration
of a producer when "the product was neither manufactured by him for
sale or any form of distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured
or distributed by him in the course of his business."' 69
American law offers a conceptually interesting set of arguments rel-
evant to this language under the heading of the "dual capacity" doc-
trine. The California Supreme Court set the stage for dispute in a
decision focusing on injuries attributed to defects in a tank truck con-
taining flammable gas, which the plaintiff was delivering to a customer
of his employer. The employer, defendant in this tort action, had
assembled about 200 bulk delivery trucks and used all but four of these
in its own operations. The plaintiff claimed that various products, other
than the tank truck, were involved in his accident, including "storage
tanks, valves, couplings, hoses and other equipment" used in the stor-
age and transportation of gas. 170
The employer defended on the ground that its exclusive liability
was that imposed by the state workers' compensation act and that thus
its employee could not sue it in tort for injuries occurring in the course
of employment. The California court, however, found a basis for liabil-
ity outside the workers' compensation legislation in relationships "dis-
tinct from that of employer-employee," which "invoke[] a different set
of obligations."i17 1 In this "dual capacity" situation, the court thought
that to bar the employee from a tort action would deny him the "protec-
tion granted to every other user of manufactured products.' 172 The
court declared that there was "naught to commend a rule . . . which
would encourage manufacturers to do less in the area of product safety
168. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(b).
169. Id. art. 7(c).
170. Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981).
171. Id. at 272.
172. Id. at 273.
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if by chance the product is to be used by their own employees." 17 3
This position, though logically argued, has not commanded wide-
spread assent. Illustrative of judicial opposition to "dual capacity"
thinking are the views of the Ohio Supreme Court. That court denied a
tort claim by an employee of Firestone Tire & Rubber Company for
injuries caused by the blowout of a Firestone tire, mounted on a truck
used in the plaintiff's employment. Although recognizing the "strong
public policies underlying the law of products liability," the court
declared that to allow a tort recovery would "elevate" those policies
over the "constitutional imperative" of the Ohio constitution's provision
that makes workers' compensation an exclusive remedy for employees
injured on the job. 174
Ironically, the language of the Directive could produce results
opposite from the contrasting outcomes in each of these two leading
American cases. With respect to the case of the tank truck, it would
appear that the exact product at issue was not "manufactured by" the
defendant employer "for sale." It is a closer question whether it was
"manufactured . ..by him in the course of his business." 175 It was
"manufactured," but arguably only in the course of the business of gas
delivery, rather than the business of manufacturing trucks.
By contrast, the Firestone tire, as a generic product, was indeed
"manufactured ... for sale."' 176 Being a fungible item, it could as well
have wound up on the truck of any buyer from a Firestone outlet as on
the plaintiff's vehicle. It would seem that, putting aside any statutory
provisions in Community states that parallel the exclusivity require-
ments of American workers' compensation statutes, a strong case would
exist for liability under the language of the Directive. For these pur-
poses, one might argue that the Firestone driver in the Ohio case was
more a "consumer" of a consumer product than was the driver of the
tank truck in the California case.
D. Compliance With Public Regulations
Another Directive provision that exonerates producers corresponds with
a rich lode of American case law. This is the clause that bars producer
liability when "the defect is due to compliance of the product with
mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities." 177
The American law appears to line up with the rule of the Directive.
For example, when a jeep manufacturer exactly complied with govern-
ment specifications, which omitted a seat belt in the vehicle, a New
Jersey appellate court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant
173. Id.
174. Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 541 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ohio 1989).
175. Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(c).
176. Id.
177. Id. art. 7(d).
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on a strict liability claim. 178 The trial court had referred to the fact that
the Government's bid contract had required the manufacturer to omit
seat belts and roll bars, 179 which the appellate court described as repre-
senting "a conscious, intentional determination by the United States
Government that the installation of seat belts would be incompatible
with the intended use of the vehicle."' 80
In another case, involving a highway exit sign pole into which the
plaintiff's car crashed, the Illinois Supreme Court declared broadly that
"[a]n independent contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the
plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to
follow.' 8 ' The opinion of the Illinois appellate, court in that case pro-
vides an interesting parallel to the body of federal law that recently has
developed on the subject. The state appellate court expressed concern
that if suit were allowed, there would be no bidders for government con-
tracts because of fear of litigation.' 8 2
The analogous body of federal law, classified under the heading of
the "government contract defense," stems from the decision of a closely
divided Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., which focused
on the crash of a military helicopter. Saying that the "selection of the
appropriate design for military equipment ... is assuredly a discretion-
ary function" under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the majority empha-
sized that such choices "involve[] not merely engineering analysis butjudgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social
considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater
safety and greater combat effectiveness."' 18 3
The majority in Boyle, speaking through Justice Scalia, set out a tri-
partite test for immunizing manufacturers for "design defects in military
equipment." The defense would apply when (1) the Government
"approved reasonably precise specifications" (2) to which the equip-
ment conformed and (3) the supplier warned the Government about
dangers known to it but not to the Government.' 8 4
Justice Scalia's emphasis, by comparison with that of the state
appellate court in the sign pole case, was on the potential burden on the
Government itself. He was apprehensive that the cost of injuries under
a liability rule "would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not
totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors will predict-
ably raise their prices" against the possibility of "contingent liability for
the Government-ordered designs."' 8 5
178. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 381 A.2d 805 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert.
denied, 384 A.2d 846 (NJ. 1978).
179. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
180. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 381 A.2d at 806.
181. Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Ill. 1978), affg 370 N.E.2d 617 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977).
182. Hunt v. Blasius, 370 N.E.2d at 621-22.
183. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988).
184. Id. at 512.
185. Id. at 511-12.
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With respect to the Directive's exception for compliance with regu-
lations, Dr. Hans Taschner has declared that producers "cannot be
placed between disobedience and liability."' 86 This philosophical point
runs in tandem with a combination of the economic concerns to which
American courts have adverted, as they might become relevant in Euro-
pean member states: the fear of reduced bidding because of liability
against contractors and apprehension that the burden of that liability
will simply be passed on to governments.
E. Defect and Defenses: Competing Values
It may be useful to consider together the definition of defect in Article
6187 and the exceptions to liability in Article 7, at least one of which-
the development risk defense-8 8 -directly affects the definition of
defect. Collectively, these provisions reflect the competing concerns
that must have weighed on the drafters as they sought to fashion a sub-
stantive definition of the sort of product profile that would occasion
liability.
The definition is a complex one because consumers themselves har-
bor competing desires, within groups and even within themselves as
individuals, and because society as a whole reflects that competition.
The Directive reflects a perception that the image the product
presents is an initial and powerful influence on consumers, whose minds
have been seeded by a variety of subtle portrayals as well as relatively
blatant advertising messages.
The Directive embodies common sense, as well as fairness, in rec-
ognizing that manufacturers cannot plan for the financial consequences
of liability unless they can predict what kinds of product uses will occa-
sion liability. It is worth noting, however, that one of the most difficult
conceptual aspects of the limitation to reasonably expected use lies in
the crashworthiness conundrum.' 8 9
Perhaps the most accurate reflection of competing consumer
demands in these sections of the Directive inheres in their references to
the effects of technological advance. The principal thrust of the Direc-
tive's references to this phenomenon' 90 is that Europe does not want
the threat of liability to impede product development. Rather, it wishes
to encourage manufacturers to continue improving their products with-
out fear that improvements will occasion damages awards.' 9 1 Implicit in
these provisions are the ideas that the acquisition of information is
186. Taschner, supra note 79, at 91.
187. See supra text accompanying note 66.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 123-44.
189. See supra text following note 117.
190. See Directive, supra note 1, arts. 6(1)(c), 6(2), and 7(e).
191. A concise, recent description of the way that tort liability may create net dis-
advantages to safety appears in Stephen F. Williams, Second-Best: The Soft Underbelly of
Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1993). Judge Williams notes, for
example, "tort law's uneven imposition of burdens" on goods on which it imposes
liability-"its failure to penalize the net drawbacks of their substitutes." Id. at 940.
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costly and that, in some cases, consumers must bear the cost of acquir-
ing the information necessary for product improvement. Subject to opt-
ing out by individual states, who must face waiting periods if they choose
to derogate from the development risk defense, the Directive also makes
a fairness judgment against liability for unknowable risks. Yet, the dero-
gation alternative itself reflects the fact that fairness has two sides with
respect to this issue: the other side relates to the equity of spreading the
loss of unknowable risks among the many who benefit indirectly from
the pain of the few.
The other substantive provisions associated with the defect idea
seek to require that the plaintiff falls within the consumer class. They
also aim to insure that the defendant is a proper economic actor on
which to pin liability, either within traditional civilian distributional
chains or when the Government is itself the consumer.
One should not carry reductionism of rationales too far in this area,
especially having underlined the complexity of consumer desires and
the conflicts they create. Yet one can discern these broad threads of
policy: The Directive aims to provide consumer protection, to assure
that it is consumers who are the object of this protection, and to advance
the powerful consumer interest in product innovation. In pursuing
these goals, the Directive embodies a recognition that fairness is a many-
splendored concept.
IX. Proof of Causation
A crucially important element of a plaintiff's products liability case, on
both sides of the Atlantic, lies in the requirement of proof of causation.
The Directive expresses this quite simply as a demand that the claimant
"prove... the causal relationship between defect and damage."' 192
A. Role of Experts
This requirement will often engender arguments about scientific fact. In
the United States, the controversy frequently focuses on the so-called
"battle of the experts." A paradigmatic and fierce set of confrontations
on this issue has come in litigation over alleged causation of birth
defects by the drug Bendectin, which was prescribed for morning sick-
ness in pregnant women.
The early decisions on the subject tended to favor the defendant
manufacturer on the grounds that the plaintiff had presented no evi-
dence of a causal relationship between Bendectin and limb deformities
in children born to women who took the drug. In one case, the plaintiff
offered an expert who testified, in the First Circuit's characterization,
that the drug "could cause limb reduction on the basis of in vivo animal
studies, in vitro animal studies, and the study of 'analogous' chemi-
Significantly, Judge Williams wrote the opinion in Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co.,
840 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988), discussed supra text accompanying note 159.
192. Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
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cals." 9 3 The court responded that these studies, "singly or in combina-
tion, do not have the capability of proving causation in human beings in
the absence of any confirmatory epidemiological data."' 94
A contrast appears in a Third Circuit holding that plaintiffs could
avoid summary judgment with the testimony of a single expert that "the
available epidemiological data"195 would support a finding that Bendec-
tin caused limb defects. The Court expressed its sympathy with "con-
cerns . . . over the costs and inequities that flow from inconsistent
outcomes in Bendectin cases," and the potential impact on the supply of
drugs. 196 However, the court did not think it could rule that the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's expert "would be unhelpful" under the standards
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 9 7
The resolution of such issues may proceed differently in Europe,
especially under the inquisitorial systems that prevail there. If the court
relies on its own experts, and indeed on its own ability to determine the
facts, it will not have to confront the problem of whether a single dis-
senting expert's testimony should be allowed to go to a nonprofessional
factfinder. This will not, however, obviate the need for courts to con-
sider the force of a lone expert's testimony. That is especially so if one
assumes that the Directive's powerful commitment to "protection of the
consumer" embodies a stance that is risk-averse to harms whose source
is uncertain.
B. Product Identification
The question of whether the defendant's product was involved in dis-
ease etiology has occupied an increasing amount of judicial time in
America. Typical of the kind of case in which a plaintiff lacks sufficient
evidence is one in which a worker claims that he was exposed to a prod-
uct made by a defendant because he worked on a job site where it was
used but does not show that he personally worked with the defendant's
product nor that he had "personal knowledge of the products used
around him."' 9 8
By contrast-and sometimes by thin slicing of distinctions-plain-
tiffs may survive summary motions when they specifically identify prod-
ucts to which they were exposed, 199 or even when a co-worker identifies
193. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987).
194. Id. The Supreme Court has granted review of a similar holding by the Ninth
Circuit. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
195. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir.
1990).
196. Id. at 951-52.
197. Id. at 956-57.
198. Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (11th
Cir. 1985).
199. See, e.g., Roberts v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
12,501, at 37,143-44 (W.D. Mich.Jan. 18, 1990).
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specific materials made by defendants. 20 0 The decisions mentioned in
the notes to this paragraph, and many others on this question, deal with
asbestos litigation. Given the ubiquitousness of man-made fibers in the
workplace environment, and even in domestic and educational settings,
one may expect this issue to recur on both sides of the Atlantic. An
inquisitorial system will not preclude the need for factual decision.
C. Overlap of Causation and Defect Issues
Some of the most interesting issues that may confront European courts
are those that arise when the "causation" and "defect" issues overlap.
Courts should try to keep these issues separate when possible.
A California decision presents a subtle mix of issues. The case
arose from an injury to a bus passenger when the driver negligently
caused the vehicle to lurch. The claimant asserted that the bus manufac-
turer was negligent because it did not put a grab bar in front of her seat,
as it had done above the back of other forward-facing seats. There was
evidence that, as she was thrown forward, the plaintiff reached for some-
thing to grab but found nothing. The court said that "[t]he need for a
'grab bar' or pole to steady oneself" in such circumstances was "a matter
within the common experience of lay jurors. ' '20 1 To this conclusion, it
joined the finding that although the matter may not have been "capable
of mathematical proof," the jury could have found that a handrail in the
plaintiff's reach would have prevented the injury.20 2
This decision illustrates the conceptual complexity that may arise
from a very simple fact situation. A court confronted with such a case
must entangle reality from a thicket of locutions that include design
defect, factual causation and materiality. The decision, for European as
well as American judges, will require an assessment of the cost of the
proposed design feature and of the fact that the manufacturer had used
it in other places in the same vehicle, as well as of probabilistic infer-
ences from a fact situation where there are unavoidable gaps.
Causation is not usually an easy matter when cases have proceeded
to trial; it may be doubly difficult when the issue becomes entwined with
policy questions concerning the desirable level of consumer protection.
Confronted with such a case, a European court must attempt to untan-
gle, while considering in tandem, the questions of whether the bar-less
seat did "not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect" 20 3
and whether there was a "causal relationship between defect and
damage.'"204
200. See, e.g., In re New York Asbestos Litigation, 738 F. Supp. 66, 69 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
201. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 231-32 (Cal. 1982).
202. Id. at 230.
203. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1); see supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
204. Id. art. 4.
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D. "Proximate Cause" and Policy Questions
We should advert briefly to a set of issues that have consistently made
their way into American legal discourse, frequently under the misnomer
of "causation." One modem prototype of these questions concerns the
responsibility of manufacturers for injuries associated with product tam-
pering. To be sure, one might put the question as whether the manufac-
turer's failure to make a product tamper-proof, or at least revelatory of
tampering, was the "proximate cause" of a consumer's injury.
This writer, influenced by the penetrating scholarship of Leon
Green, 20 5 would suggest that the more appropriate statement of the
issue is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. Judge Goet-
tel of the Southern District of New York adopted such an analysis in
denying recovery for the death of a young woman who had swallowed
Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide. Saying that duty was "bound up
with notions of public policy and the realities of everyday life," he saw it
as "a tool by which society places controllable limits on actions and inac-
tions for which parties may be answerable in damages."' 20 6 Relative to
the case before him, he concluded that "[s]uch a duty, once created,
could not possibly be cabined."'20 7
The Directive does not, on its face, provide a conceptual matrix for
dealing with such issues. Inevitably, however, they will present them-
selves to European courts. It would be well if Community judges recog-
nize them for the policy questions they are rather than force them into
the mold of "causation," "proximate" or otherwise.
X. Apportionment of Liabilities
Another important cluster of issues involves the apportionment of liabil-
ity among parties causally connected with an injury. In addition to firms
that are initially the subject of suits, these parties may include claimants
themselves and third parties, including other sellers, who have contrib-
uted to an accident or illness.
A. With Plaintiffs
1. Directive Provision on Claimants' Fault
The Directive straightforwardly sets up a comparative responsibility
defense, declaring that producer liability "may be reduced or disallowed
when, having regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused both
by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or any
person for whom the injured person is responsible." 20 8
This author surmises from private conversation that there were seri-
ous reservations among drafters and advisers concerning the wisdom of
205. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: I, 28 COLUM. L. REv.
1014 (1928) and II, 29 COLUM. L. Rzv. 255 (1929).
206. Elsroth v. Johnson &Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
207. Id.
208. Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
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this provision. For example, one argument against any defense based
on the plaintiff's conduct was that such defenses would undercut the
policies supporting the Directive's fundamental theory of liability with-
out fault.
2. American Comparisons
a. Generally
Given the existence of the defense, however, an American analyst
should suggest that a crucial question is whether European interpreters
of the Directive will allow defenses based on such claimant fault as a
failure to discover information, or only those based on conduct that
foolishly persists in the face of a known danger. This is the principal line
of demarcation concerning claimants' conduct in American law. In
products cases, United States courts have tended to prefer the latter
defense, usually cast in terms of "assumption of risk," to the traditional
doctrine of contributory negligence. 20 9
In a few states, courts have gone even further to abrogate the
defenses altogether in a particular environment: the workplace. For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court initially held that assumption
of risk will not provide a defense against a strict liability claim for indus-
trial injuries. The court reasoned that manufacturers "should not be
permitted to escape from the breach of ... duty to an employee while
carrying out his assigned task.., when observance of that duty would
have prevented the very accident which occurred."' 2 10 In a later deci-
sion that barred the defense in negligence cases, the New Jersey court
declared that "[a] factory worker pursuing his assigned task on a plant
machine has no real choice," with "[t]he practicalities of the workaday
world" enforcing a situation in which "the employee works 'as is' or he
is without ajob."2 1'1
This view is not likely to persuade most American courts, but Euro-
pean analysts may wish to consider it in light of the Directive's stated
goal of"a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technolog-
ical production." 21 2
The effort to define defenses based on claimant conduct has gener-
ated a waterfall of terminology, featuring such concepts as "obvious
danger" and "misuse." The "obviousness" idea, as explained above,
overlaps substantially with judicial intuitions that there is no defect or
no duty to warn. I need only reemphasize that the use of this language
appears to embody a moral judgment. 213
209. See, e.g., 2 SHAPO, supra note 37, 5 20.01[13][a] (summarizing precedents).
210. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 148 (N.J. 1979).
211. Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 471 A.2d 15, 20 (N.J. 1984).
212. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 2.
213. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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b. "Misuse" Concept
The defense denominated "misuse" in the American law intersects with
the clause in the Directive's definition of defect that refers to "the use to
which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be
put."' 2 14 Without denying that there may be some independent vitality
in the "misuse" concept under the "defect" heading, this writer thinks
that when courts say a product has been "misused," usually they believe
that the plaintiff was foolish, and probably very foolish. Generally
speaking, this writer suggests that under the Directive, the basic ques-
tion is at what level of plaintiff carelessness to set the definition of "the
fault of the injured person."'2 15
c. Comparison of Responsibility: Doctrinal Contrasts
One should note that the Directive appears to sweep before it some the-
oretical questions that have fascinated American courts and commenta-
tors, with respect to comparison of defendants' and plaintiffs' conduct.
This set of issues relates to the doctrinal mixture of liability without fault
on the defendant's side and reduction of damages for fault on the plain-
tiff's side. One statement of the theoretical difficulty appeared in a sepa-
rate opinion in a California case in which Justice Jefferson criticized the
attempt to "reduce" to a common denominator the "two noncom-
parables" of negligent plaintiff conduct and a defective product. 2 16
Although the drafters of the Directive seem to have decided that
this was not a problem, how one compares the two elements may pres-
ent something of a puzzle in Europe as well as the United States. The
difficulty of sorting out the issue is evident in the smorgasbord of opin-
ions in American law about what to compare, including "causation,"
"liability," and, most broadly, "responsibility." 2 17 The key, for the
drafters of the Directive, appears to lie in the notion of "fair apportion-
ment of risk between the injured person and the producer. 21 8
B. Among Third Parties
The other major segment of apportionment questions relates to the
division of responsibility among producers and suppliers. The Direc-
tive's mandates on this subject seek to effectuate a maximum liability to
the plaintiff, leaving apportionment rights to be sorted out among
responsible parties.
The Directive makes plain that multiple causes of an injury will not
prevent a plaintiff from recovering all of his or her damages from one
contributing party. It says specifically that when "two or more persons
214. Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(b).
215. For commentary on this point in the context of American law, see 2 SHAPO,
supra note 37, 20.03[1], 21.0816][c][i].
216. Daly v. General Motors, 575 P.2d 1162, 1180 (Cal. 1978) (Jefferson, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
217. See, e.g., 2 SHAPO, supra note 37, 22.03[3][b], 22.08.
218. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 7.
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are liable for the same damage, they shall be liable jointly and sever-
ally.' ' 219 Moreover, it declares that a producer's liability "shall not be
reduced when the damage is caused both by a defect in the product and
by the act or omission of a third party." 220
Accompanying both of these provisions are statements that each
shall operate "without prejudice to the provisions of national law con-
cerning the rights of contribution or recourse." 22 1 If the American
development is predictive, one may expect that under this broad lan-
guage, European courts will develop analogues to doctrinal distinctions
like those between "primary" and "secondary" negligence or "active"
and "passive" conduct in an effort to achieve a fair allocation of
responsibility.222
XI. Repose and Limitations
A. Limitations; Discovery Rule
The Directive provides periods of both limitation and repose, in a way
generally familiar to American products law. The limitation period is
three years, 223 and the Directive specifically builds in a discovery rule.
This provision, which is relatively liberal toward plaintiffs, begins the
limitations period on "the day on which the plaintiff became aware, or
reasonably should have become aware, of the damage, the defect and
the identity of the producer." 224
The requirement that the plaintiff be aware of the damage is the
foundation stone of a discovery rule. It expands the limitations period
for the general class of cases, many involving chemicals, fibers and
drugs, in which plaintiffs do not become aware of harm until many years
after exposure.
In declaring that the plaintiff should reasonably be aware of the
defect, the Directive settles an important and controversial issue in favor
of claimants. In the background of this question are the many situations
in which a plaintiff knows of a harm, such as an illness, but is not aware
that a product is a cause of the harm. In that context, arguably the
requirement of knowledge of defect could be interpreted to include
knowledge of causation.
A case that illustrates this point involved the prescription hormone
DES, to which the plaintiff ascribed adenosis because of her mother's
ingestion of the product during pregnancy. The plaintiff admitted that
219. Id. art. 5.
220. Id. art. 8(1). The Preamble reemphasizes the point, saying that the "protec-
tion of the consumer requires that the injured person should be able to claim full
compensation for ... damage from any one of" several liable persons. Id. pmbl.
para. 5.
221. Id. arts. 5, 8(1). I have used the orthography of art. 5, with which art. 8(1)
varies slightly.
222. See, e.g., 1 SHAPO, supra note 7, 14.04[1], [2], [5].
223. Directive, supra note I, art. 10(l).
224. Id.
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she knew about "the possibility of a causal nexus" as early as 1973.225
However, in applying the discovery rule, the court pointed out that as
late as 1981 the defendants were claiming that there was "no certain
relationship between ingestion of DES by pregnant women and adenosis
... [in] their offspring."'22 6
Unavoidably, the requirement of plaintiff awareness of the defect
will confront European courts with the same kind of difficult factual
issues that have arisen under American discovery rules. Another DES
case demonstrates the factual knottiness of the cases. A majority of the
Third Circuit barred the action of a teenage "DES daughter" who had
read a magazine article and had a conversation with a physician that
raised the possibility of an association between her mother's ingestion of
the hormone and her cancer. 2 27 The court did not think the discovery
rule saved the plaintiffis case even though her mother denied to her,
over a period of three years, that she had taken the drug.228 Judge Hig-
ginbotham's dissent acidly etched the factual controversy. He said that
to hold that the plaintiffis information constituted discovery was to take
"[a] rigid view of what is the permissible rational conduct of a teenager
who has read in a general magazine, a two-column, six paragraph article
which is not written by anyone purporting to be a physician or medical
expert of any type."'229
As loath as European courts may be to balance policy considera-
tions, the factual issues that will arise under the Directive's discovery
rule may require them to undertake that task. The Maryland Court of
Appeals did so in declaring that "an action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known he had a cause of action," in response to a
certified question in a case involving paralysis illeged to be caused by
an anesthetic. 230 It spoke both of the "predicament" of plaintiffs "who
cannot discover manufacturer wrongdoing or product defect through a
reasonably diligent investigation," and the burdens of "keep[ing] a
defendant shackled to long past liabilities," which "hinders a defend-
ant's ability to plan for the future. ' '2 3 1
The Directive's requirement that the plaintiff have reasonable
opportunity for knowledge of the producer's identity settles an issue
that has split American courts. 23 2 Especially in the case of products that
cause multiple injuries over a period of time, it would seem that this rule
is a just one. As a federal court noted in another DES case, a producer
of such goods cannot argue that a delayed suit has prejudiced its ability
to defend itself.23 3
225. Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 (D.D.C. 1982).
226. Id.
227. O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 707-11 (3d Cir. 1981).
228. Id. at 707-11.
229. Id. at 714 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
230. Pennwalt Co. v. Nasios, 550 A.2d 1155, 1167 (Md. 1988).
231. Id. at 1166-67.
232. See generally 2 SHAPO, supra note 37, 30.07[4].
233. See Yustick v. Eli Lilly & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
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Though the problem of cancers in "DES daughters" is one peculiar
to a specific product and a closely defined population, it is no accident
that some of the most interesting cases involving the discovery rule have
arisen from litigation on that question. The DES problem symbolizes
the latency period issues that will continue to arise from chemical and
biological agents. It also is highly symptomatic of the irreducibly factual
nature of the questions likely to arise under the Directive's rule, particu-
larly under the heading of discovery of defect.
B. Repose Period
A more stringent boundary to plaintiffs' actions under the Directive
appears in its statute of repose, which requires member states to provide
that rights to sue "shall be extinguished ... 10 years from the date on
which the producer put into circulation the actual product which caused
the damage." 234 The Preamble in effect identifies a linkage between
this provision and other parts of the Directive that deal with advances in
product development. It also observes that products "age in the course
of time, higher safety standards are developed and the state of science
and technology progresses." 23 5 For those reasons, the Preamble
declares, "it would not be reasonable to make the producer liable for an
unlimited period for the defectiveness of his product." 23 6
The repose period appears to admit no exceptions. An American
observer may simply remark that if one or more DES-type episodes
sweep through the Community, the Council may decide to reconsider
the balance it has struck, at least with a time limit that is relatively short
in a world of biologicals and chemicals. The problem ofjustice is that in
achieving certainty for producers, a repose period literally can bar a
right of action "before it ever existed." 23 7
XII. Contracting Out
The Directive settles very crisply the question of disclaimers and limita-
tions of liability: it does not allow them "in relation to the injured per-
son." 23 8 The drafters thought that the Directive needed a provision
outlawing "contractual derogation" for the "effective protection of con-
sumers." 23 9 Given the strict liability underpinnings of the Directive, this
accords with the American law. An illustrative pronouncement, from an
Illinois court, stressed that "liability in a strict liability action is imposed
independent of contractual considerations." 240 The fact that there has
been little effort by American companies to enforce such provisions
234. Directive, supra note 1, art. 11.
235. Id. pmbl. para. 11.
236. Id.
237. See Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1981).
238. Directive, supra note 1, art. 12.
239. Id. pmbl. para. 12.
240. Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 380 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ill. App. 1978).
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against claims for personal injuries may indicate corporate recognition
of the moral force of this principle.
XIII. Remedies
A. Directive's Preservation of Remedies
The Directive makes clear that its liabilities are cumulative to, rather
than replacing, other remedies. Specifically, it preserves "any rights"
under "the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or
a special liability system existing" when the Directive becomes effec-
tive 24 1-the reference to special liability systems being explained as per-
taining to pharmaceuticals. 24 2
The broader reservation of rights evokes mention of a blossoming
of American case law around the coexistence of tort and warranty-based
theories. Some American jurisdictions have tended to equate the con-
cepts. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, declared that "all
considerations governing the appropriate burden of proof' in strict lia-
bility and warranty actions are "identical." 2 43
Other American courts have stressed that strict liability creates a
"new tort,"' 244 or a "new theory of recovery," the effect of which is that a
defendant could claim that the addition of a claim based on the strict
liability theory constitutes unfair surprise.2 45 It is not evident what
analogous effect the novelty of the Directive's theory may have on Com-
munity litigation. However, it does appear that even in member states
that have enforced virtually strict forms of liability, the theory is a dis-
tinct one and certainly different from any contractual doctrine.
It seems clear that the Directive would not permit the result that
obtains in some American jurisdictions: the holding that the Uniform
Commercial Code preempts the field, as against tort theories, for prod-
uct-caused injuries.24 6 The drafters emphasized that to the extent that
other theories of liability "also serve to attain the objective of effective
protection of consumers, they should remain unaffected by this Direc-
tive."' 24 7 The provision preserving other remedies thus dovetails with
the anti-disclaimer clause to assure a broad field of maneuver for
consumers.
Given the emphasis on economic theory in a wing of American
products liability scholarship, it is notable that the Directive concedes
little to the idea that modern products commerce involves traditional
bargains. We may link this discussion to a point made earlier, that the
Directive does not specify rules relating to products warnings. Although
241. Directive, supra note 1, art. 13.
242. See id pmbl. para. 13.
243. Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 590 (Colo. 1984).
244. Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 252 S.E.2d 623, 624 (Ga. 1979).
245. Trevithick v. Abbott Laboratories, 421 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979).
246. See, e.g., Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 979 (Del. 1980).
247. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 13.
Cornell International Law Journal
the contributory fault provision implies an assumption that consumers
exercise choice in confronting products in particular situations, it
appears that the drafters viewed consumer choice in the modem world
as being relatively constrained. Arguably, this is a message conveyed by
the tri-comered combination of the anti-disclaimer clause, the preserva-
tion of remedies provision and the lack of specificity about warnings.
B. Damages Limitations
The Directive provides member states with the option of limiting dam-
ages for multiple injuries caused by the same product, one of the princi-
pal fonts of "mass tort" liability. It allows a ceiling of 70 million ECU
"for damage resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by
identical items with the same defect." 248 The drafters made clear that
their default rule was one of unlimited liability, saying that given "the
legal traditions in most of the Member States, it is inappropriate to set
any financial ceiling on the producer's liability without fault." 2 49 How-
ever, because of "differing traditions," they did allow member states to
"derogate from the principle of unlimited liability."' 250 At the same
time, re-striking a dual policy motif that runs through some parts of the
Directive, they declared that the limit must be "at a level sufficiently high
to guarantee adequate protection of the consumer and the correct func-
tioning of the common market. '25 1
These provisions are not unfamiliar to observers based in a federal
union and evoke some of the problems of limiting total liability that have
arisen from multiple injuries cases in the United States. For producers
that sell widely throughout the European Community, the Directive may
not effectively constrain liability, since presumably most member states
will follow their "legal traditions." In that case, it would seem that a
question of equity would arise for consumers in derogating states.
This is not to ignore the problem, sometimes extending to corpo-
rate ruin, created by unlimited liabilities. The principal controversy on
the subject in America has centered on multiple punitive damages. This
problem has bedeviled American judges and observers. 252 But even if
one believes there should be a limit placed on multiple punitive awards,
248. Id. art. 16(1). Germany is said to have insisted on this clause "against the
majority of the Member States," arguing that only a limitation on damages would
make it possible to insure product risks. Criticizing this position, two commentators
say that with unlimited liability, "insurance with limited cover will be more easily
available and most likely be cheaper, because the producer bears the upper tail of the
risk and thus has an incentive to avoid large losses." These observers ask why one
should limit "liability principles ... by the extent to which the associated risk of being
held liable can be insured?" Finsinger & Simon, supra note 73, at 208.
249. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 17.
250. Id-
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., the successive opinions of'Judge Sarokin inJuzwin v. Amtorg Trading
Co., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064-65 (D. N.J. 1989) and 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235-36 (D.
NJ. 1989).
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it seems more difficult to rationalize a regime that enforces a limitation
on compensatory damages in some states but not others.
Unlike the derogation rules concerning the development risk
2 53
and primary agricultural products, 25 4 the damages option focuses on
the medium of compensation and not substantive legal theory. To this
commentator, at least, to provide an alternative of limiting damage
amounts appears seriously to compromise the principle of uniformity.
The Directive itself recognizes the tensions inherent in this provision. It
requires that, after ten years, the Commission submit a report to the
Council on the effect of the damages option. The policy standard is the
dual one of "the effect on consumer protection and the functioning of
the common market," and the Commission is to refer to Article 100 of
the EEC Treaty when deciding whether to repeal the option
provision.2 55
XIV. Assessment
A. A Law Being Born
The Directive is relatively spare in presentation and style. It is dotted
with provisions implying that it is a law being born, rather than a full
grown product. Even with its long process of gestation, and the relevant
legal experience of both the member states and the American law, that is
what one would expect.
This writer has indicated in various forums his skepticism about
proposals for comprehensive federal legislation on products liability in
the American context. 2 56 That skepticism arises partly out of a concern
that legislation would chisel solutions into an unmalleable material that
would be very difficult to change, given the labyrinthine character of the
federal lawmaking process. The writer is wary of the general, supra-
national solution achieved by the Directive for the same reason, even
putting aside concerns about linguistic differences 25 7 and different judg-
ing traditions. 258 Moreover, the failure of several states to enact legisla-
253. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
255. Directive, supra note 1, art. 16(2).
256. See, e.g., The Product Liability Reform Act: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. J-101-89, at 31-38 (1990).
257. See, e.g., Alpa, supra note 26, at 246-47 (noting, for example, that "[t]he Italian
term 'danno' corresponds to the French 'dommage' (though in French it is generally
found in the form 'dommages-interets') but not entirely to the English 'damage' which
indicates the pecuniary consequences of what, at least in this Directive, is translated
as 'injury' ").
258. See id. at 261 (asking "whether judges of different cultures, who have different
rules to observe, will all react, when faced with a text of this kind, in the same man-
ner, arriving at the same decision."). Illustrative of what one assumes will be a flock
of complex ancillary issues on various intra-European aspects of the subject is a hold-
ing by the European Court of Justice in a suit by a French firm that bought metal
polishing machines from Firm A, to which were attached suction systems made by
Firm B, a German company, and sold by Firm B's French subsidiary. According to a
summary of the decision, the court held that the claimant, as a "secondary pur-
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tion implementing the Directive in timely fashion suggests that
recalcitrance may work to sabotage uniformity, although a very recent
decision by the European Court of Justice has upheld a private claim-
ant's suit for damages for failure to enforce a Directive. 25 9
Yet the authors of the Directive have made clear that they expect
review of their product in the future, both in the general and the particu-
lar. At a general level, the Directive's last substantive article mandates
that the Commission submit a report to the Council every five years "on
the application of this Directive and, if necessary.., submit appropriate
proposals" to the Council. 260 We have referred above to the Directive's
more specific requirements that the Commission report to the Council
after ten years on the effect of the derogation option on the develop-
ment risk defense 261 and of the option concerning damage limits. 26 2
The Preamble specifically refers to the need for "a period of sufficient
length to gather practical experience on the effects of [the] deroga-
tions"-presumably including that on primary agricultural products and
game-"on the protection of consumers and on the functioning of the
common market."'2 63
B. Policy Goals: Balancing and Thrust
Beyond the particularized issues that this Article has identified in the
specific provisions of the Directive, some of the long-term questions for
the Community's lawmaking bodies will arise at the intersection of pol-
icy preferences expressed in the document.
The Preamble identifies several goals, which do not necessarily con-
flict in particular applications, but which exhibit certain tensions among
them. It declares that "approximation of the laws of the Member States
... is necessary because the existing divergences may distort competi-
tion and affect the movement of goods within the common market and
entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage
caused by a defective product to his health or property. '2 64
chaser," could not sue Firm B in France under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Conven-
tion, which permits suits on contractual claims in the country where the contract was
performed. The ECJ held that the suit did not involve a "contractual matter," over-
turning the judgment of a French court that had held it had jurisdiction. Reportedly,
the court said that in most Brussels Convention States, a "manufacturer's relation-
ship with a secondary purchaser is not considered contractual." See EC Ruling May
Limit Choice of Courts for Parties in Product Liability Cases, 20 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP.
(BNA) 692 (July 3, 1992).
259. Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich & Danila Bonifaci v. Italy
(Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 19, 1991) discussed in James E. Hanft, Note, Francovich and Bonifad v.
Italy: EEC Member State Liability for Failure to Implement Community Directives, 15 FORD-
HAM INT'L LJ. 1237 (1991-92).
260. Directive, supra note 1, art. 21.
261. See supra text accompanying note 151.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 253-55.
263. Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 19.
264. Id. pmbl. para. 1.
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Beyond the language of the Directive itself, scholars and practition-
ers in Europe have emphasized to this writer that those who promul-
gated the Directive were at least as interested in uniformity as they were
in the substantive principles that such legislation would contain. A
strong version of this view asserts that at least one member state whose
products jurisprudence came close to strict liability was concerned with
the relatively less stringent form of liability in other member states.
According to proponents of this position, a germinating seed for the
Directive came more from a desire to enforce equal protection for man-
ufacturers in states with stricter liability than a desire to achieve strict
liability itself.
The Directive's references to distortion of competition and effects
on the movement of goods tend to validate this view. The tone of those
phrases is essentially neutral as between producer and consumer, and
the reference to competition seems to imply an assumption that con-
sumers routinely and actively strike bargains for products-an assump-
tion that is not so apparent in other parts of the Directive.
A similar balancing of goals is evident in the Directive's twinned
references to "consumer protection and the functioning of the common
market" in the clauses providing for review of the derogation provision
on the development risk defense 26 5 and of the option provision on lim-
ited liability.26 6 It also appears in the paragraphs of the Preamble that
focus on the latter provision 26 7 and on the need to reexamine the dero-
gations after experience has accumulated on the operation of the
Directive.268
At least one reference in the Preamble to fairness makes clear that
the question of what is fair is a two-way street on which producers as
well as consumers may travel. This is the language declaring that "a fair
apportionment of risk between the injured persorr and the producer
implies that the producer should be able to free himself from liability if
he furnishes proof as to the existence of certain exonerating circum-
stances." 2 69 At the same time, the Preamble's reference to "a fair
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological produc-
tion," 2 70 taken together with the basic choice of a theory of liability
without fault, indicates that the desire for consumer protection was a
fundamental and motivating force in the promulgation of the Directive.
The Preamble's frequent and unqualified references to "protection
of the consumer" confirm that conclusion. Early on, to be sure, that
language is pinned to the problem of lack of uniformity.2 7 1 The unqual-
265. Id. art. 15(3).
266. Id. art. 16(2).
267. Id. pmbl. paras. 17, 19.
268. Id. pmbl. para. 19.
269. Id. pmbl. para. 7.
270. Id. pmbl. para. 2.
271. See id. pmbl. para. 1.
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ified phraseology, however, includes the use of consumer protection
language in these clauses of the Preamble:
(1) Language dealing with the need to cast the liability net across
the entire production process; 272
(2) The declaration that the producer's liability should be unaf-
fected by the contributing causation of others;2 73
(3) The reference to the need for compensation for death, per-
sonal injury and property damage;2 74
(4) The clause dealing with the prohibition of contractual
derogation; 27 5
(5) The paragraph that explains the Directive's preservation of
other theories of recovery and liability systems; 2 76
(6) The clause referring to the derogation provision on the excep-
tion of primary agricultural products from the Directive's liability
rule;2 7 7
(7) The language rationalizing the provision that permits member
states to derogate from the development risk defense.2 78
C. Consumer Protection: Definitional Issues and Basic
Commitments
As is the case with many pieces of significant legislation, the Directive
presents many opportunities for interpretative argument. The language
of the document reveals a complex group of philosophical
underpinnings.
As it must under Article 100 of the Treaty, the Directive seeks to
improve the functioning of the common market. Uniformity thus is 'a
principal goal.
Yet the key informing principle appears to be that of consumer pro-
tection. The Directive does not ignore the fact that consumers bear
responsibility for their conduct. But its references to the risks of mod-
em technology, and its repeated use of unadorned consumer protection
language in the Preamble, together with the designation of liability with-
out fault as the operative doctrine, indicate that the consumer is the pri-
mary beneficiary of the legislation. Even the rather convoluted language
of the Preamble's reference to the derogation option on the develop-
ment risk defense indicates that the goal of the "Community stand-still
procedure" is "to raise, if possible, the level of protection in a uniform
manner throughout the Community."'2 79
272. Id. pmbl. para. 4.
273. Id. pmbl. para. 8.
274. Id. pmbl. para. 9.
275. Id. pmbl. para. 12.
276. Id. pmbl. para. 13.
277. Id. pmbl. para. 15.
278. Id. pmbl. para. 16.
279. Id. pmbl. para. 16.
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The strength of this commitment leads us to inquire as to the char-
acteristics of consumerhood that led the Community to adopt the Direc-
tive. It appears the drafters believed that in a technological world, the
principal locus of control lies with the producer. Although the idea that
consumers themselves make bargains is not entirely absent from the
document, it appears to view their ability to choose as relatively
constrained.
Although it refers in a macro sense to the functioning of the Com-
mon Market, the Directive does not speak boldly or often about the
trade-offs inherent in the development of consumer products. Even the
choice of the development risk defense manifests a recognition that pro-
ducers control the very process of development.
In the face of a growing American legal literature inspired by a com-
mitment to efficient solutions, the Directive's reliance on economic the-
ory appears only in a single reference in the Preamble to the need to
avoid distortion of competition and in such language as abstract refer-
ences to the "correct functioning of the common market," 28 0 which usu-
ally are cabled to phraseology about protection of the consumer.
By contrast, the Preamble's repeated, unqualified references to con-
sumer protection indicate that, in adopting the Directive, the Council
must have viewed the primary moral responsibility for product injuries
as resting with producers. It is not clear how much of the Council's
motivation stemmed from a generalized assumption about the inability
of consumers to make meaningful choices or from a commitment to risk-
spreading. It does appear, however, that the Directive embodies ajudg-
ment about where control typically resides.
A tantalizing question that remains concerns the sort of "consumer
protection" the Directive envisions. Does the repeated use of that phra-
seology indicate a sense that Community judges should generally tilt
toward producer liability in order to achieve greater deterrence of prod-
ucts injuries, as well as transfers of wealth to injury victims? Or does
"consumer protection" imply a primary commitment to a utilitarian-
based notion of consumer welfare?
It appears that, despite its references to distortion of competition
and the movement of goods within the Community, the Directive does
not seek a utilitarian solution. Its focus clearly seems more on a market
subject to uniform rules, with a discernible bias toward consumers, than
on an efficient market under the strictures of microeconomic theory.
Read in its entirety, the document exhibits a policy preference for the
fixing of financial responsibility on producers. The Directive does not
explain how much of this preference arises from a generalized social
deterrence theory and how much reflects a desire to compensate injured
persons.
What is particularly remarkable to an American observer is the
force of the Directive's commitment. With American courts in a holding
280. See, e.g., id. pmbl. para. 17.
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pattern on the development of strict liability theory, and Congress con-
fronting repeated appeals to cut back on producer liability, the Commu-
nity has made a firm, supranational decision favoring "liability without
fault." The economic wisdom of that decision is open for argument. So
is the choice of a moral framework, but it would appear that the Com-
munity has made that judgment its foundational one.
